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Abstract:
Tens of millions of people enroll in research studies in the United States every
year, making human subjects research a multi-billion-dollar industry in the U.S.
alone. Research carries risks: although many harms are inevitable, some also arise
from errors or mistreatment by researchers, and the history of research ethics is in
many ways a history of scandal. Despite regulatory efforts to remedy these abuses,
injured subjects nonetheless have little recourse to U.S. courts. In the absence of
tort remedies for research-related injuries, the only venue for resolving such
disputes is through alternative dispute resolution (ADR)—or more commonly,
internal dispute resolution (IDR) through a process offered by the research
institution. The federal regulations on human subjects are silent on resolving
subject grievances, and to date, little is known about how institutions handle these
disputes. This Article is the first empirical study of how U.S. universities and
hospitals resolve subjects’ claims of physical injury, dignitary harm, noncompensation, deviations from research protocols, and maltreatment by research
staff. I have conducted in-depth interviews with personnel from 30 hospitals and
universities to understand how institutions respond to grievances involving
research subjects. These interviews reveal highly flexible dispute resolution
processes managed by institutional review boards (IRBs), the institutional
authorities mandated by federal law to protect human subjects. Although many
interviewees spoke intuitively of procedural justice—including elements such as
voice, neutrality, and courtesy—these interviews also indicated problems with
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neutrality, expertise, representation of participants, one-sided appeals, and access
to the dispute resolution process itself. This Article takes a close look at current
practices, and then suggests strategies for improvement, addressing both the
federal regulations and options for institution-led reforms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Research is an enormous enterprise; more than 19 million individuals
participate in research studies per year,1 and the annual costs of research in the
U.S. include an estimated $32 billion in NIH funds2 and over $50 billion in
pharmaceutical funding alone.3 Although federal regulations, state laws, and
professional organizations apply countless mandates to institutions that conduct
human subjects research, the processes for resolving research participants’
concerns are a curiously unregulated space. Where grievances arise, U.S. courts
have recognized claims relating to physical injuries, negligent study design and
oversight, and insufficiency of informed consent.4 But courts cannot and do not
respond to most research-related injuries. Litigation is procedurally unavailable for
large classes of research participants, such as international subjects or subjects in
intramural federal projects.5 Moreover, many research-related disputes are not
amenable to courtroom remedies. Recent work suggests that there is a high
frequency of non-justiciable complaints in healthcare settings,6 and a few such
concerns in research may include study staff rudeness, offensive recruitment
efforts, or post-trial access to study drugs. Prior findings suggest widespread
confusion among subjects about study protocols,7 and this confusion may engender
other subject complaints. Where litigation is not feasible, or where complaints are
not cognizable in courts, institutions may seek to provide alternative fora for
resolving research-related disputes. These ADR practices, however, have gone
entirely unnoticed by scholarship.
Responsiveness to research subjects’ injuries and complaints is a legal,
ethical, and practical imperative for research institutions. At institutions that
receive federal funds for research, federal regulations governing research with
1
Adil E. Shamoo, Adverse Events Reporting—The Tip of the Iceberg, 8 ACCOUNTABILITY
RES. 197, 197 (2001).
2 Budget, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/budget
[https://perma.cc/2LNT-VL3A].
3 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, 2015 Biopharmaceutical Research
Industry Profile 36, http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015_phrma_profile.pdf.
4 Roger L. Jansson, Researcher Liability for Negligence in Human Subject Research: Informed
Consent and Researcher Malpractice Actions, 78 WASH. L. REV. 229 (2003).
5 Elizabeth R. Pike, Recovering from Research: A No-Fault Proposal to Compensate Injured
Research Participants, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 29-30 (2012).
6 See Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Deconstructing Dispute Classifications: Avoiding the Shadow of
the Law in Dispute System Design in Healthcare, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 55 (2010).
7 Matthew E. Falagas et al., Informed Consent: How Much and What Do Patients Understand?,
198 AM. J. SURGERY 420 (2009); James Flory & Ezekiel Emanuel, Interventions to Improve Research
Participants’ Understanding in Informed Consent for Research: A Systematic Review, 292 JAMA
1593 (2004); Adam Nishimura et al., Improving Understanding in the Research Informed Consent
Process: A Systematic Review of 54 Interventions Tested in Randomized Control Trials, 14 BMC
MED. ETHICS 28 (2013).
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human subjects (the “Common Rule”) delegate oversight over research protocols
to institutional review boards (IRBs). IRBs are tasked with a priori review and
approval of research protocols, after determining an appropriate balance of risks
and benefits, equitable selection of subjects, and reviewing procedures for securing
informed consent from participants or their legally authorized representatives.8 In
approving and monitoring protocols, U.S. IRBs often take as their guiding
principles those set forth in the Belmont Report, a 1979 set of guidelines issued by
the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research. Although the Common Rule does not specify the procedures
that institutions must use when grievances arise during research, federal
regulations do require that participants receive “an explanation of whom to
contact . . . in the event of a research-related injury.”9 This implies that responding
to such contacts is indeed a legal imperative for research institutions, and most
institutions house that responsibility within the IRB.
As an ethical matter, the duty to respond to participants’ concerns over the
course of research follows from the Belmont Report’s emphasis on respect for
subjects’ autonomy, justice and the equitable selection of study subjects, and
minimization of research burdens (beneficence and non-maleficence).10 Because
unforeseen problems may arise during research studies, each of these ethical goals
requires that when participants allege injuries or grievances, institutions
responsible for conducting research must remain responsive to these ongoing
problems. Several scholars have noted that “researcher ethnocentrism” can limit
researchers’ ability to identify ethical problems in their own protocols, and
researchers sitting on IRBs may be no different;11 providing a feedback loop for
subject complaints is an essential means of augmenting IRB review and oversight.
As a practical matter, providing a forum for the resolution of research-related
complaints may avert litigation, identify unforeseen problems in research
protocols, promote stable relationships between research institutions and
communities who may participate in research, and encourage participation among
subjects who may be concerned about accountability in the event of injury.
Prior literature suggests that research institutions do, in fact, maintain internal
processes for the resolution of research-related disputes, and IRBs provide these
procedures as part of their research oversight role. But almost nothing is known to
date about how these processes work. Scholarship on internal dispute resolution
(IDR) systems—dispute resolution procedures maintained internally by
corporations or other institutions—reflects concerns about procedural fairness.
8 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2018).
9 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(7) (2018)
10 NAT’L COMM’N FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, THE BELMONT REPORT (1979).
11 REBECCA DRESSER, SILENT PARTNERS: HUMAN SUBJECTS AND RESEARCH ETHICS 2 (2017).
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When one party to a dispute has structured the process by which that dispute is
resolved, there are many opportunities to build institutional advantage into these
procedures.12 The need for procedural fairness is keen when parties waive claims
and other venues, such as an agreement not to sue, or when other venues are
unavailable from the outset (e.g., because litigation is unavailable, or because the
complaint is not legally cognizable). IRBs themselves are in a curious role. They
have a federal mandate to protect subject well-being, independent of the institution,
and the institution may not authorize research that lacks IRB approval. IRBs do
not do research themselves, and their practices and decisions are rarely the subject
of subject complaints. They are thus infrequent “parties” to the disputes. But IRBs
are nevertheless institutional bodies and composed largely of institutional
employees and staff, and they are not blind to institutional liabilities. This Article
will therefore consider IRB-managed processes as “internal” to the institution,
despite IRBs’ independent grant of authority to approve and oversee human
subjects research.
This Article proceeds on the premise that providing procedurally just
grievance procedures in human subjects research is an entailment of the ethical
duty to provide resolution to research-related complaints and injuries. Importantly,
IRBs enact and implement these systems amid long-standing power imbalances
between researchers, research institutions, and participant communities. The
history of research abuses worldwide is long, and biomedical research in the U.S.
has provided some of the most acute examples of studies that violated subjects’
rights, autonomy, dignity, and humanity.13 The current regulatory system is
intended to curb these abuses, bolstered by ethical guidance such as the Belmont
Report, the Declaration of Helsinki, and the Nuremberg Code. But despite these
regulatory frameworks, power disparities between participants and research
institutions persist. This is in part a result of epidemiology. The burden of ill health,
and the risk of ill health, is unevenly distributed along lines of socioeconomic
status, race, ethnicity, education, disability, and other axes of social
marginalization.14 Research protocols for the study of disease prevention, etiology,
progression, and treatment, are therefore likely to recruit and enroll participants
12 See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen & Howard S. Erlanger, The Endogeneity
of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 406 (1999);
Mark Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9
L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
13 See, e.g., HARRIET WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID (2014).
14 See Paula Braverman & Laura Gottlieb, The Social Determinants of Health: It’s Time to
Consider the Causes of the Causes, 129 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 19 (2014); Sandro Galea et al., Estimated
Deaths Attributable to Social Factors in the United States, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1456 (2011);
Steven H. Woolf & Paula Braverman, Where Health Disparities Begin: The Role of Social and
Economic Determinants – and Why Current Policies May Make Matters Worse, 30 HEALTH AFF.
1852 (2011).
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with relatively less socioeconomic power—perhaps due to convenience and cost,
but also as a function of the distribution of disease, as well as the separately
impoverishing effects of disease. Biomedical research with healthy, compensated
volunteers may also draw poorer subjects willing to trade off their time,
convenience, and (sometimes) safety for pay. Multiple studies have shown how
participants may approach research as a form of employment,15 but compensation
for research participation is held down to avoid problems of unduly influencing
poor individuals to take research risks.16 Some have also argued that current
practices of payment for research participation exploit an “underclass” of healthy
volunteers compensated to test experimental medications in Phase I trials—the
first (and riskiest) human tests of new drugs.17
Given these dynamics, when a dispute arises due to perceived injury or
misconduct experienced by research participants, research institutions often hold
a comparative advantage in sophistication, access to human and financial
resources, and access to the legal system—compared to both participants and
investigators. Institutions are also repeat players, compared to participants who
may only take part in one or a few studies, and they may experience a comparative
advantage due to expertise or relationships strengthened by multiple experiences.
These comparative disadvantages for research participants present intertwining
ethical and procedural questions when designing a dispute resolution system.
Researchers’ interests are also at stake. When resolving disputes between
participants and investigators, IRBs also have the task of balancing investigators’
interests, which may at times diverge from the interests of the institution. For
example, complaints alleging researcher misconduct, protocol deviations, or
harassment may expose institutions to liability, but the stakes are high for the
investigators themselves, who could face termination of their research protocol,
their entire research program, or their employment. These situations can be
precarious for subjects, investigators, and research institutions alike, and IRBs
faced with the management (or even merely the initial intake) of these disputes
must navigate these conflicts. Although researchers do not have the historic
structural disadvantage of research participants—they are well-educated and at
times legally sophisticated parties—researchers’ experience of fair process is
essential for the long-term function of these dispute resolution programs.
The goal of this Article is to provide the first description of IDR processes
15 See, e.g., ROBERTO ABADIE, THE PROFESSIONAL GUINEA PIG: BIG PHARMA AND THE RISKY
WORLD OF HUMAN SUBJECTS (2010); Carl Elliott & Roberto Abadie, Exploiting a Research
Underclass in Phase 1 Clinical Trials, 1 N. ENG. J. MED. 2316 (2008).
16 See Emily A. Largent and Holly Fernandez Lynch, Paying Research Participants:
Regulatory Uncertainty, Conceptual Confusion, and a Path Forward, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L.
& ETHICS 61 (2017); William M. Sage, Paying Research Subjects: The U.S. Example, in ESSAIS
CLINIQUES, QUELLS RISQUES? 137 (A. Laude & D. Tabuteau, eds., 2007).
17 ABADIE, supra note 15; Elliott & Abadie, supra note 15.
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used by research institutions to address injuries and other grievances brought by
participants in human subjects research. My in-depth interviews with informants
at federally funded U.S. hospitals and universities have revealed that institutions
maintain permanent, highly flexible IDR processes in which the IRB manages
initial complaint intake, complaint investigation, involvement of institutional and
sometimes external stakeholders, identification of potential remedies, decisions
that are binding for research protocols, and enforcement of those decisions. These
processes accommodate not only physical injuries, but also non-justiciable claims
and concerns brought by people who are not (or not yet) enrolled in research
protocols. The highly flexible and sometimes unwritten nature of these processes
allows IRBs substantial discretion in the dispute resolution process, and IRBs use
this discretion to maximize participation and voice for subjects, investigators, and
other community stakeholders. Informants often described the goals of their IDR
systems with reference to Belmont Report principles, including respect for
autonomy and justice. IRB informants also noted their federal mandate to protect
research subjects, and discussed research subjects with attention to potential
vulnerability or disparities in resources and sophistication. This case study
provides a useful demonstration more generally of how procedural flexibility in
ADR can serve participation and legitimacy interests for complainants.
Despite the wide breadth of these IDR systems, however, this study identified
recurring shortcomings of IDR processes for research-related disputes. This
Article will consider three shortcomings in particular. First, as a procedural matter,
the design of these systems uniformly omitted consultation with participants, or
with non-institutional personnel who could represent participant interests. IRBs
typically began with informal office practices for handling subject complaints, and
then codified these practices into more formal systems when pursuing institutional
accreditation under the Association for the Accreditation of Human Research
Protection Programs (AAHRPP), which requires a written policy on complaint
resolution. Design features mitigate the problem of non-consultation: for example,
built-in procedural flexibility allowed individual subjects some control over the
process at the time of their complaint, IRB personnel who designed the systems
might be said to represent participant interests already, and some IRBs involved
trusted local authorities at the moment when disputes arose. But the lack of
participant consultation at the time of system design was a missed opportunity to
establish systems that would be accessible and trusted by participants.
Second, informants consistently believed that uptake by subjects was low,
compared to hypothesized rates of injuries and other complaints. There are
numerous explanations for a lower rate of uptake, including a low frequency of
grievances, low salience or importance of grievances to research subjects, and high
effectiveness of initial researcher responses (i.e., before participants decide to
contact the IRB). But a low rate of uptake may also indicate deficiencies in the
64
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process. Some informants suggested that participants may be suspicious of IRBmaintained systems as non-neutral processes, while many suggested that
participants are unaware that the institution is willing to remedy research-related
complaints. Based on my study of the available processes, as well as typical
disclosures and informed consent forms, another possibility is that procedural
flexibility itself can complicate efforts to make such processes predictable, and to
make procedural information available in advance. The flexibility for IRBs to
determine procedures on a case-by-case basis may undermine the predictability
and legitimacy of the process for prospective claimants (those considering
complaining), even though the IRB may seek to use that flexibility in ways that
benefit actual claimants who are using the process.
Third, these interviews also indicated significant ambiguity regarding the
capacity of IRBs to undertake dispute resolution, with respect to both neutrality
and skills. Although these bodies must protect research participants, researchrelated disputes systems ask the same personnel to act neutrally toward
investigators and the institution, which may be concerned about legal exposure,
public image, and sustainability of relationships with participant communities.
IRB personnel are also colleagues with ongoing relationships with investigators,
and informants acknowledged that the stakes of some complaints for investigators
are high. Sensitivity to investigator interests may account for the common practice
of allowing investigators to appeal IRB decisions, while participants are not
generally given notice of an appeal opportunity. In many ways, the use of IRBs to
resolve research-related disputes is efficient: it takes advantage of existing
scientific expertise; the federal regulations already give these bodies enforceable
control over research protocols, which is often needed for durable remedies; and
IRBs’ central mandate to safeguard participant well-being may provide a muchneeded thumb on the scale in favor of participant interests. But some informants
in this study noted difficulties in maintaining impartiality in the face of institutional
pressure and investigator pushback, and IRB personnel often noted their lack of
training in dispute resolution, mediation, or investigations. Managing researchrelated disputes can also tax IRBs’ human resources, especially given the range of
potential procedures that may be necessary to fully address a complex dispute.
Based on these findings, this Article offers several recommendations to
improve the design of IDR systems for resolving research-related complaints.
Because participants are party to all such disputes, and particularly in light of the
power disparities between research institutions and participants, institutions should
involve participants themselves in the initial design or improvement of a dispute
resolution system. Baseline data on the frequency of participant grievances is
largely unavailable, particularly for complaints alleging intangible harm, and it is
difficult to be certain that the low uptake of IDR systems is problematic. But in
light of preliminary evidence that systems are underutilized, I suggest a greater
65
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emphasis on dispute resolution systems in the informed consent process, perhaps
including procedural information and requiring a verbal discussion in addition to
written informed consent, where practicable. Finally, although it may not be
necessary to take these procedures out of the IRB, I suggest that institutions may
consider providing IRB personnel with training in dispute resolution, conflict
management, or mediation, as well as additional personnel for highly complex
complaints. Furthermore, it may improve neutrality to provide for independent
external review of IRBs’ dispute decisions, which may be invoked by the
participant, investigator, and IRB itself. It may be unwise to establish these as
federal regulatory requirements, given the advantages of procedural flexibility in
this context. But research institutions may in fact adopt these practices voluntarily,
given the ethical and practical advantages of a functioning IDR program.
This Article proceeds in the following Parts. Part II will situate researchrelated disputes in the context of other ADR uses in healthcare settings, and then
identify the sources of authority, ethical guidance, and regulatory flexibility for
research institutions to design processes that address participant injuries and
concerns. Part III presents the empirical study and a process-specific appraisal of
institutional systems for research-related disputes. This section will note the
multiple roles of the IRB throughout the IDR process, as well as IRBs’ uses of
procedural flexibility to serve what they perceive to be participants’ interests. Part
IV discusses informants’ appraisal of these systems, followed by a more critical
evaluation of strengths and weaknesses. Part V concludes by considering strategies
for improving IDR in this context.
II. IDR FOR RESEARCH-RELATED DISPUTES
Despite a wide-ranging set of federal regulations, federal laws, state laws, and
professional requirements governing research with human subjects, there is a
persistent gap in formal guidance for resolving disputes that arise in human
subjects research. The federal regulations that govern most research in the United
States are silent on this issue, as are federal and state laws and aspirational ethical
guidance governing domestic and global research. This gap in regulation
corresponds to a near-total absence of knowledge about the processes by which
research-related injuries and disputes are resolved.18 Most scholarship in this area
focuses on the problem of financial compensation for physical injuries that arise
in the course of research.19 Although many such injuries are unavoidable risks of
18 Kristen Underhill, Legal and Ethical Values in the Resolution of Research-Related Disputes:
How Can IRBs Respond to Participant Complaints?, 9 J. EMP. RES. HUM. RES. ETHICS 71 (2014).
19 Carl Elliott, Justice for Injured Research Subjects, 367 N. ENG. J. MED. 6 (2012); Michelle
M. Mello, David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, The Rise of Litigation in Human Subjects
Research, 139 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 40 (2003); E. Haavi Morreim, Clinical Trials Litigation:
Practical Realities as Seen from the Trenches, 12 ACCOUNTABILITY RES. 47 (2005); Pike, supra note
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clinical research, some have provided a valid basis for litigation, including
justiciable claims against institutions and individuals who conduct research, IRBs
and institutional officials who oversee research, research sponsors, and
manufacturers of products tested in clinical research protocols.20 Institutions may
seek to settle such claims quickly,21 but the IDR processes that may facilitate
settlement are entirely unknown. Moreover, even when physical injuries are
alleged, litigation is unavailable for several categories of claimant and injury,
making alternative dispute resolution processes the only option for dispute
resolution.22
The scholarly focus on physical injuries has also obscured a much wider
universe of potential grievances by research participants, including claims with
more precarious footing in U.S. courts. These may include claims of dignitary or
intangible harm, participant abandonment, inadequate informed consent, negligent
protocol design, post-research access to drugs or devices, access to incidental
research findings, or concerns about compensation, or complaints about the lack
of privacy or confidentiality.23 Where such claims have been unsuccessful in
litigation, ADR processes are once again the only available forum for dispute
resolution. The remainder of this Section will consider other uses of ADR in
healthcare settings, available guidance for IRBs responding to research-related
complaints, and predictable categories of disputes.
A. Uses of IDR in Healthcare
IDR programs are on the rise in healthcare settings, largely inspired by
changes in the resolution of medical malpractice claims. These systems include
communication-and-resolution programs for medical errors,24 disclosure and
apology programs for the proactive disclosure of errors,25 and the use of
ombudsmen or other internal complaint-handling processes for both justiciable and
5.
20 David B. Resnick, Liability for Institutional Review Boards: From Regulation to Litigation,
25 J. LEGAL MED. 131 (2004); Mello et al., supra note 19.
21 Mello et al., supra note 19, at 43.
22 Here, I consider ADR to include institutional processes for compensating injuries through
insurance, if the institution is one of the few that insures against research-related injuries. See Pike,
supra note 5.
23 See infra. Richard S. Saver, Medical Research and Intangible Harm, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 941
(2005) [hereinafter Saver, Medical Research]; Richard S. Saver, At the End of the Clinical Trial:
Does Access to Investigational Technology End as Well?, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 411 (2009)
[hereinafter Saver, At the End]; Morreim, supra note 19; Underhill, supra note 18.
24 William M. Sage et al., How Policy Makers Can Smooth the Way for Communication-andResolution Programs, 33 HEALTH AFF. 11 (2014).
25 Maria Pearlmutter, Physician Apologies and General Admissions of Fault: Amending the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 687 (2011); Joanna C. Schwartz, A Dose of Reality for
Medical Malpractice Reform, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1224 (2013).
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non-justiciable complaints in hospital settings.26 Institutions are also
experimenting with private or court-annexed medical malpractice arbitration.27
Mandatory arbitration has been particularly controversial in the nursing home
setting, and as of this writing, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has
proposed a rule that would loosen requirements needed for nursing homes to
impose binding arbitration agreements.28 Licensing boards for physicians and
nurses offer another forum for the resolution of complaints against individual
providers, including complaints from patients and referrals from other
authorities.29 Because these are external, rather than IDR programs, however, they
are less applicable to research-related disputes.)
IDR is also used outside the context of medical errors and patient complaints.
Healthcare ethics committees have emerged as a method for managing disputes
about courses of treatment for patients, reconciling the interests of patients,
families, and caregivers.30 Bioethics mediation processes, including particularly
the approach suggested by Nancy Dubler and Carol Liebman, integrates mediation
skills into clinical ethics consultation, promoting shared decision-making and
consensus in clinical conflicts.31 Outside clinical care, health insurers offer internal
procedures for managing coverage disputes, with external review mandated by
state law (in most states)32 and the Affordable Care Act.33 Some disputes that arise
26 Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Escaping the Shadow of Malpractice Law, 74 L. & Contemp. Probs.
241 (2011); Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Beyond IDR: Resolving Hospital Disputes and Healing Ailing
Organizations through ITR, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 173 (2007); Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 6.
27 Matthew Parrott, Is Compulsory Court-Annexed Medical Malpractice Arbitration
Constitutional?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685 (2007); Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, Analytic
Framework for Dispute Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 128 (2009) (reporting Kaiser
case study).
28 82 Fed. Reg. 26649 (June 8, 2017) CMS Issues Proposed Revision Requirements for LongTerm Care Facilities’ Arbitration Agreements, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (June 5,
2017),
https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2017-Fact-Sheetitems/2017-06-05.html.
29 Timothy S. Jost et al., Consumers, Complaints, and Professional Discipline: A Look at
Medical Licensure Boards, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 309 (1993).
30 Thaddeus Mason Pope, Multi-Institutional Healthcare Ethics Committees: The Procedurally
Fair Internal Dispute Resolution Mechanism?, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 257 (2009).
31 NANCY NEVELOFF DUBLER & CAROL B. LIEBMAN, BIOETHICS MEDIATION: A GUIDE TO
SHAPING SHARED SOLUTIONS (2011).
32 Nan Hunter, Managed Process, Due Care: Structures of Accountability in Health Care, 6
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 93 (2006).
33 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148 (2010); Interim Final Rules for
Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and
External Review Processes under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 FR 43329, July
23, 2010 (codified at 26 C.F.R. § 54, 26 C.F.R. § 602, 29 C.F.R. § 2590, 45 § C.F.R. 147 (2017));
Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers: Rules Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and
External Review Processes 76 F.R. 37207, June 22, 2011, codified at 26 C.F.R. § 54; 29 C.F.R. §
2590, and 45 C.F.R. § 147 (2017). The ACA mandates external review mechanisms for coverage
determinations in group health plans and individual plans in the federal and state marketplaces.
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in healthcare and health research settings are also those of large organizations more
generally, including concerns about employment and discrimination, interpersonal
conflicts, shared credit and workload, and organizational concerns. Susan Sturm
and Howard Gadlin have discussed the National Institutes of Health’s ombudsman
program for handling these types of disputes, noting the interplay between
individual-level and systemic analyses and solutions for organizational problems.34
Aggregating these IDR processes raises questions about healthcare
exceptionalism:35 whether process values or goals should be differently weighted
in healthcare settings because there are distinctive interests at stake. Procedural
scholars have long enumerated the underlying purposes and values of procedural
due process adjudication, and claims about the values served by process have
extended from litigation and administrative adjudication to ADR and IDR. 36 The
design of dispute resolution procedures are now widely acknowledged to serve not
only accuracy, 37 but also other values, particularly given the impossibility of
perfect accuracy in any system.38 One such value is participation by claimants,
either because participation is an intrinsic good,39 or because it is instrumental40 in
producing a psychological experience of fairness,41 promoting dignified
treatment,42 or conferring legitimacy on decisions.43 Other values may include
system legitimacy (including “the appearance of fairness”44), predictability,45

34 Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J. DISP.
RESOLUTION 1, 2 (2007).
35 Hunter, supra note 32.
36 See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal
Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127 (2011); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural
Justice and the Rule of Law: Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2011 J. DISP.
RESOL. 1 (2011).
37 Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of
Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S.
CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004).
38 Laurens Walker, Avoiding Surprise from Federal Civil Rule Making: The Role of Economic
Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 569 (1994); Solum, supra note 37, at 185.
39 See, e.g., JERRY MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 177 (1985).
40 See Matthew J.B. Lawrence, Procedural Triage, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 79 (2015) (describing
the importance of participation with respect to psychological, dignitary, and legitimacy theories).
41 See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 275-80 (2002) (noting
that “a taste for fairness” may explain individual preferences for some procedures in adjudication,
but also expressing skepticism that strong preferences exist); see also Lawrence, supra note 40, at 92
(examining psychological theories that consider the inherent value of participation in dispute
resolution, including satisfying a preference for fair treatment).
42 Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 BOS.
U.L. REV. 885, 886 (1981); MASHAW, supra note 39.
43 Solum, supra note 37; accord Lawrence, supra note 40.
44 Redish & Marshall, supra note 37.
45 Mashaw, supra note 39 at 175-76, also quoted by Redish & Marshall, supra note 37.
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equality of parties,46 accountability of parties,47 “revelation” and explanation of the
events that led to the claim,48 and respect for dignity and privacy.49
Many (although not all) grievances arising in healthcare settings present a
unique combination of physical or mental vulnerability, information asymmetry,
emotional weight, socioeconomic disparity, cultural difference, urgency, and
visceral need, particularly conflicts involving individual patients and healthcare
providers.50 In this context, process values such as revelation, equality,
accountability, participation, and dignity take on greater salience; IDR innovations
such as disclosure-and-apology, communication-and-resolution, and bioethics
mediation express these values clearly. Because research with human subjects
presents many of the same contextual features, we may expect similar process
values to have a high priority in IDR for research-related complaints.
The legitimacy of not only the IDR process, but also the larger system of
healthcare services is also an important priority for inherent and instrumental
reasons. Medical mistrust is a formidable barrier to accessing care51 and promoting
quality in care delivery52 and perceived mistreatment in medical contexts can foster
litigation and violence.53 Both undermine the core goals of healthcare institutions,
many of which are nonprofit corporations principally engaged in patient care.
Given the goals of institutional legitimacy, such institutions may be more receptive
to addressing non-justiciable disputes based on interests rather than legal rights.54
IDR is the only process option for these types of disputes. Many IDR processes in
healthcare settings were established as alternatives to public adjudication of
justiciable claims, such as medical malpractice claims sounding in tort or coverage
disputes sounding in contract. But IDR innovations in health law also extend to
46 Redish & Marshall, supra note 37, at 484-85; MASHAW, supra note 39 at 171.
47 See Galanter, supra note 12. This is particularly problematic for some forms of ADR, such
as internal dispute resolution, whereby one party designs the procedural rules and provides the forum.
See Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the Haves Hold Court: Speculations on the
Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 941 (1999).
48 Redish & Marshall, supra note 37 (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational
Aims in Procedural Due Process, 18 DUE PROCESS: NOMOS 126, 127 (1977)); Hunter, supra note 32.
49 Mashaw’s theory considers dignity the overarching underlying value served by equality,
predictability, participation, and privacy. MASHAW, supra note 39, at 172-82.
50 Hunter, supra note 32.
51 Thomas A. LaVeist, Lydia A. Isaac, & Karen Patricia Williams, Mistrust of Health Care
Organizations is Associated with Underutilization of Health Services, 44 HEALTH SERVS. REV. 2093
(2009); Kristen Underhill et al., A Qualitative Study of Medical Mistrust, Perceived Discrimination,
and Risk Behavior Disclosure to Clinicians by U.S. Male Sex Workers and Other Men Who Have Sex
with Men, 92 J. URBAN HEALTH 667 (2014).
52 Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 6, at 69; see also Mark A. Hall et al., Trust in Physicians and
Medical Institutions: What Is It, Can It Be Measured, and Does It Matter?, 79 MILBANK Q. 613
(2001).
53 Id. at 68, 78.
54 Id.
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disputes that would not support litigation in public courts. Bioethics mediation,
healthcare ethics committees, internal complaint-handling mechanisms and
hotlines at hospitals, and fora such as ombudsman programs in large health-related
organizations all address both justiciable and non-justiciable claims. The
availability of fora for these disputes promotes not only participation values, but
also legitimacy of the care system more generally. These themes are all present in
the context of research-related disputes, to which we now turn.
B. Authority and Guidance for IDR in Research Settings
Although the institutions that conduct human subjects research are subject to
complex and overlapping federal and state laws, as well as informal ethics
guidance and the requirements of professional self-governance and accreditation,
the resolution of research-related disputes is an almost entirely unregulated space.
This Section will describe the authority and existing guidance for research
institutions addressing participant complaints.
The regulatory provisions governing research with human subjects include 45
C.F.R. § 46 (for research at institutions receiving federal funding through most
agencies and departments) and 21 C.F.R. § 50 and 21 C.F.R. § 56 (for research
that will be submitted as part of an application for FDA approval of a new drug or
device). These regulations grant IRBs (which may be internal or external to
research institutions) the authority to approve and monitor research protocols on
an ongoing basis. As part of this authority, IRBs are empowered to withdraw
approval, suspend, or terminate studies.55 This authority entails stoppage or
modification of a protocol in response to a complaint or injury. Although IRBs
have authority over research protocols, however, the federal regulations are silent
on the processes by which participant grievances should be resolved. The Common
Rule refers to these processes only directly: as part of informed consent,
participants must receive contact information for a party who can provide “answers
to pertinent questions about the research and research subjects’ rights, and . . . in
the event of a research-related injury to the subject.”56 Institutions almost
universally satisfy this requirement by providing participants with the contact
information of the IRB, although the regulations do not specify that the IRB is the
correct or only resource for questions about rights and injuries.57 Dispute resolution
receives no further attention in the recent revisions to the Common Rule.58
The Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP) within the Department of

55 45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (2018).
56 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(7) (2018); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(7) (2018).
57 Underhill, supra note 18.
58 Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (Jan. 19, 2017).
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Health and Human Services, which is tasked with enforcing the Common Rule,59
has issued formal guidance to assist institutions in their oversight of human
subjects research. These guidance documents, however, address only subject
concerns that fall into the categories of “adverse events” or “unanticipated problem
involving risks to subjects or others.”60 Adverse events are narrowly defined as
“untoward or unfavorable medical occurrence[s] . . . temporarily associated with
the subject’s participation in the research,” while unexpected problems are
incidents that are “unexpected . . . related or possibly related to participation in the
research . . . [and] suggest that the research places subjects or others at a greater
risk of harm . . . than was previously known or recognized.”61 Even within these
categories, the focus of OHRP guidance is on how institutions should report the
events and correct the research protocol—rather than providing mechanisms for
addressing the harm experienced by the individual subjects. OHRP does not direct
IRBs to enact a complaint resolution policy separate from these procedures. 62
Many states also govern human research by statute or regulation, but like the
federal regulations, these are typically silent on the mechanisms by which
institutions resolve disputes with individual participants. State statutes governing
research in California, for example, require that participants in medical research
receive “the name, address, and phone number of an impartial third party, not
associated with the experiment, to whom the subject may address complaints about
the experiment.”63 “Impartial third party,” however, is not defined, nor is the
procedure by which this third party should resolve the dispute.64 New York state
law requires that research protocols falling outside federal regulatory requirements
be reviewed by a “human research review committee”65 and that researchers secure
informed consent from subjects,66 but does not address the resolution of research59 Sharona Hoffman, Continued Concern: Human Subject Protection, the Institutional Review
Board, and Continuing Review, 68 TENN. L. REV. 725 (2001).
60 45 C.F.R. § 46.108(a)((4)(i) (2018).
61 DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS,
Unanticipated Problems Involving Risks & Adverse Events Guidance (2007).
62 The self-assessment tool for OHRP’s Quality Assessment Program asks whether the IRB
operates a “hot line or 800 number for potential or enrolled participants to file complaints or direct
questions regarding human subjects protection issues,” as well as whether the IRB provides an
advocacy program or ombudsman for participants, but no additional guidance appears to be available
in this area. Office for Human Research Protections, QA Self Assessment Tool,
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/education-and-outreach/human-research-protection-programfundamentals/ohrp-self-assessment-tool/index.html (Retrieved March 5, 2013).
63 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 24173(c)(10).
64 Research with prisoners may be an exceptional case. California also requires that “provisions
have been made for compensating research related injury” occurring to prisoners enrolled in research,
and that the Department of Corrections provide a process for hearing grievances occurring in
research. Cal. Penal Code § 3515(d), 3518.
65 N.Y. Pub. Health § 2444.
66 N.Y. Pub. Health § 2442.
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related complaints.
Apart from federal and state law, a quasi-binding requirement for institutions
to address research-related complaints arises from professional accreditation.
Modern IRBs are often part of broader “human research protection programs” in
research institutions, which encompass functions such as protocol review and
approval, research ethics instruction for investigators and research staff,
development of institutional policies, ensuring compliance of research protocols
with state law, monitoring conflicts of interest in research, and managing
unanticipated problems and adverse events. Human research protection programs
can apply for accreditation by the Association for the Accreditation of Human
Research Protection Programs (AAHRPP), which has two requirements relevant
to the management of research-related disputes. First, researchers and staff must
“have a process to address participants’ concerns, complaints, and requests for
information.”67 Second, organizations as a whole must “ha[ve] and follo[w] written
policies and procedures that establish a safe, confidential, and reliable channel for
current, perspective, or past research participants . . . that permits them to discuss
problems, concerns, and questions; obtain information; or offer input with an
informed individual who is unaffiliated with the specific research protocol or
plan.”68 This duty is not located with the IRB; for example, organizations could
fulfill the requirements using an ombudsman or research subject advocate.
AAHRPP has set no requirements for structure of these processes, but simply
requires that they exist, and implies that they should handle all types of concerns—
including those that are not justiciable in public courts.69
Aspirational ethics documents provide “soft law” principles that plausibly
imply that researchers and research institutions have a duty to address the full range
of participant complaints.70 As noted above, there is a vast array of ethical guidance
documents in medical research, including the Belmont Report, the Nuremberg
Code, the CIOMS guidelines, the WMA Declaration of Helsinki, and others. These
offer additional values that might be relevant to dispute systems design here, but
no specific procedural guidance. On the basis of the Belmont report, for example,
the design of a dispute resolution system in this field might seek to promote
participant autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice defined as

67 Assoc. for Accreditation of Human Research Protection Programs, AAHRPP Accreditation
Standards, Oct. 1, 2009.
68 Id.
69 IRB professionals can pursue individual certification through the Certified IRB Professional
program (CIP) run by the Public Responsible in Medicine & Research (PRIM&R) organization. This
program, however, does not provide specific training on the management of research-related
disputes.
PRIM&R,
CIP
Body
of
Knowledge/Content
Outline,
https://www.primr.org/certification/cip/bodyofknowledge/.
70 Underhill, supra note 18.
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equitable access to the benefits and burdens of research.71 But these broad norms
leave wide latitude for procedures that attempt to address grievances arising in the
course of research.
In some ways, this flexibility is typical of research oversight more generally,
in which the regulation of research is broadly decentralized and delegated to IRBs
as what Laura Stark has called “declarative groups—their act of deeming a practice
acceptable would make it so.”72 The federal regulations do not dictate the outcome
of any particular protocol, but rather leave these decisions up to IRBs themselves,
even permitting IRBs to waive informed consent requirements entirely under
certain conditions.73 IRBs also retain procedural flexibility in the format of their
deliberations, and institutional practices on IRB membership and deliberation
vary; variation across IRBs is reinforced by consulting prior decisions within the
institution as precedent.74
D. Gaps in Understanding Research-Related Disputes
Despite near-total freedom for the design of IDR processes in this field, the
actual dispute resolution practices of research institutions operating in this
regulatory gap have gone entirely unexamined. Drawing on the literatures above,
many similar process values will be important for the resolution of disputes in this
field. These include the values of participation, legitimacy (including legitimacy
of the process and broader legitimacy of scientific research), predictability for
potential and actual disputants, equality and accountability in a context where
research subjects are less powerful than research institutions, revelation for
subjects interacting with a highly specialized field of knowledge, and dignity and
privacy interests for all disputants. Moreover, dispute systems for resolving
research-related disputes likely have similar proximate goals to other ADR
processes, such as efficiency, durability, and party satisfaction.
I have previously noted the range of grievances that may arise in human
subjects research.75 Most previous scholarship in this area has focused on physical
injuries that are inherent risks of research,76 or that arise from negligence in
protocol design, approval, or implementation.77 Litigants bringing tort claims
71 NAT’L COMM’N FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, THE BELMONT REPORT (1979).
72 Laura Stark, Victims in Our Own Minds? IRBs in Myth and Practice, 41 L. & SOC’Y REV.
777 (2007) [hereinafter Stark, Victims]; LAURA STARK, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: IRBS AND THE
MAKING OF ETHICAL RESEARCH 164 (2012); Laura Stark & Jeremy A. Greene, Clinical Trials,
Healthy Controls, and the Birth of the IRB, 375 N. ENG. J. MED. 1013 (2016).
73 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(f) (2018).
74 Stark, Victims, supra note 72; STARK, supra note 72, at 165.
75 Underhill, supra note 18.
76 Pike, supra note 5.
77 Mello et al., supra note 19.
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against research institutions have alleged wrongs including negligent protocol
design or implementation, lack of informed consent, emotional distress, fraud,
misrepresentation, battery, medical malpractice, products liability claims, privacy
violations, breach of contract, wrongful death, state law violations, conspiracy,
participant abandonment, unjust enrichment, and IRB misconduct including
negligent study approval and oversight.78 Additional claims may include failure to
disclose individual study results, premature study termination, and withholding or
denying access to treatments after the study has concluded.79 Complaints made
outside litigation have included allegations of noncompliance with protocols,
delayed payments, unwanted requests for study participation, perceived HIPAA
violations,80 and lack of confidentiality.81 Research on the therapeutic and
preventive misconceptions suggests that many participants do not fully understand
protocols at the time of informed consent,82 which can generate complaints later.
Many of the concerns visible in healthcare settings more generally—such as
perceived rudeness, long wait times, miscommunications, and other “small-scale
disputes”83—are almost certainly present in the research context as well. Other
complaints may have more in common with workplace grievances; many
participants in non-therapeutic research see their participation as paid work, and
view study terms as conditions of employment.84 There has been no systematic
study, however, of how institutions may seek to resolve the universe of participant
concerns.
For many if not most of these claims, IDR processes are the only available
venue for dispute resolution. Litigation is a poor fit for many of these disputes.
Some of the claims noted above have been rejected by courts (e.g., claims to posttrial access85) or do not allege legal violations (e.g., unwanted requests for study
participation). Litigation is also legally or practically unavailable for some
categories of research subjects. As Elizabeth Pike has pointed out, international
participants may be barred from recovery due to the Federal Tort Claims Act and
78 Underhill, supra note 18 (citing additional sources), Mello et al., supra note 19; Saver, At
the End, supra note 23; Saver, Medical Research, supra note 23; Morreim, supra note 19.
79 Gordon 2009, Saver, Medical Research, supra note 23
80 HIPAA does not provide for a private right of action, but state courts may rely on HIPAA
for setting the standard of care in tort actions for privacy violations. Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics
& Gynecology, P.C., 314 CONN. 433 (2014) https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/
litigationnews/top_stories/030215-hipaa-disclosure.html.
81 Underhill, supra note 18 (citing sources).
82 Flory & Emanuel, supra note 8.
83 Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 6.
84 Peter Davidson & Kimberly Page, Research Participation as Work: Comparing the
Perspectives of Researchers and Economically Marginalized Populations, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1254 (2012). The journal GUINEA PIG ZERO—an “occupational jobzine” for study participants—is
emblematic of this view. http://www.guineapigzero.com/. See also sources cited infra n. 88.
85 Saver, At the End, supra note 23.
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the Alien Tort Statute,86 and US participants in federally conducted research may
find their claims precluded due to sovereign immunity and the discretionary
function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. Litigation has a number of
drawbacks in the research context as well, including high costs that may raise the
costs of research and lead IRBs to make excessively conservative decisions about
study approval.87
The literature on research-related disputes sheds little light on IDR options.
Although some institutions provide no-fault compensation programs for researchrelated injuries, such programs are rare,88 and we know little about the processes
or process values they employ. Several protocols have set up study-specific ADR
(not necessarily IDR) processes; interestingly, the two published papers on these
processes are in HIV/AIDS research, reflecting the history of participant advocacy
and community-based research.89 Both programs resembled arbitration. In one
program, a series of HIV vaccine trials in India created a three-person arbitration
board to handle all grievances.90 The other program was an informal arbitration
system established for a consortium of AIDS treatment trials and was established
to promote participants’ “right to be treated with dignity”; participants could have
their complaints represented by a social worker before a study panel, with the
option to appeal the panel decision to the IRB.91
Only one published paper has described institutional practices for complaint
resolution, published by IRB professionals at the Baylor College of Medicine.92
The Baylor system provides for an “iterative process that seeks to identify the truth
about research-related complaints through fact-finding efforts.”93 As understood
by this IRB, due process requires objectivity and the opportunity for all parties “to
speak to the ‘truth’ as they perceive it.”94 Procedural elements include the
requirement of a written complaint, IRB classification of the complaint as
noncompliance or scientific misconduct, notification of a compliance assessment
team and the principal investigator, a formal audit of study materials and “fact86 Pike, supra note 5; see also Sarah Gantz, Judge Dismisses $1 Billion Guatemalan Syphilis
Experiment Case against Hopkins, Others, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 9, 2016; Estate of Alvarez v. Johns
Hopkins Univ., 205 F. Supp. 3d 681 (D. Md. 2016).
87 Mello et al., supra note 19; Underhill, supra note 18.
88 Pike, supra note 5; Elliott, supra note 19.
89 Underhill, supra note 18.
90 J.L. Excler et al., Preparedness for AIDS Vaccine Trials in India, 127 INDIAN J. MED. RES.
531 (2008).
91 Lisa E. Cox & Thomas M. Kerkering, Grievance Procedures as Assurance for the HIVInfected Clinical Trial Participant, 1993 AIDS PATIENT CARE 20 (1993).
92 Kathleen J. Motil, Janet Allen, and Allison Taylor, When a Research Subject Calls with a
Complaint, What Will the Institutional Review Board Do?, 26 IRB: ETHICS & HUMAN RESEARCH 9
(2004)
93 Id. at 13.
94 Id. at 9.
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finding” through interviewing relevant parties, review of factual findings by an
IRB subcommittee, a face-to-face “hearing” involving the investigator and IRB
subcommittee (but not the subject), full IRB deliberation and a preliminary
decision imposing corrective actions or sanctions on the investigator, an option for
the investigator to appeal the decision, and a final decision letter by the full IRB
setting forth factual determinations and a binding corrective action plan. This
arbitration-like process appears to prioritize accuracy and investigator voice, but
says little about voice or remedy for the individual participant.
IDR has structural limitations in this context, particularly when the ADR
process are maintained by institutions themselves. IRBs who maintain ADR
processes have divided loyalties to their institutions, their colleagues, and the
participants they are tasked with protecting, and IRB administrators may be
concerned about their own liability in the event of litigation.95 Financial incentives
for researchers and institutions may encourage unethical behavior in both the
oversight and implementation of research protocols.96 And like all IDR programs,
this context raises concerns about privatizing legal norms, transmuting rightsbased claims into organizational issues, providing a highly unequal forum, and
deterring publicly useful litigation.97 But where IDR may be the only practicable
option for resolving many of these disputes, it is important to interrogate the
process choices that institutions have already made.
III. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF IDR FOR RESEARCH-RELATED DISPUTES
No previous research has examined the role of IDR in the resolution of
research-related disputes. This Part will introduce the study methods, followed by
results describing the frequency and nature of complaints, process options, uses of
procedural flexibility, and informants’ appraisal of their processes. Throughout, I
will use “informants” to refer to individuals who participated in my interviews,
and “subjects” or “participants” to refer to individuals who lodge (or may lodge)
complaints with their IRBs. Where I have quoted informants directly, I have
selected quotes that are most striking or most typical of responses across the full
set of informants.
A. Methods
The goal of this empirical study was to understand the structure and animating
procedural values of ADR processes that research institutions use to manage
95 Mello et al., supra note 19.
96 Carl Elliott, The University of Minnesota’s Medical Research Mess, The N.Y. Times, May
26, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/opinion/the-university-of-minnesotas-medicalresearch-mess.html.
97 See, e.g., Edelman & Suchman, supra note 47.
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disputes involving human subjects. This Part presents the result of in-depth, semistructured qualitative interviews with human research protections program officers
at 30 hospitals and academic institutions throughout the US. All procedures were
approved by the Yale Human Subjects Committee and advised by an expert panel
of 6 scholars and IRB professionals. Data were protected by a Certificate of
Confidentiality (COC) from NIH, which aims to facilitate research on sensitive
topics by shielding individual participant data from subpoena.98
The population of interest for this study was IRB chairs, directors, and other
designated IRB personnel who have discretion in responding to complaints; all
individuals in the study had at least 1 year of experience reviewing human subjects
protocols and had discretion in managing institutional responses to participant
complaints. I interviewed one person per institution, with the exception of one
institution, where I ran a joint interview with two IRB officers. Twenty-six of the
31 informants were chairs or directors of their IRBs; the others were managers or
administrative chairs.
The unit of analysis for this study was the institution; I included IRBs that
reviewed protocols for a hospital or academic institution, were located in the US
and subject to US federal regulation, and had an OHRP-approved federal-wide
assurance number.99 A majority of eligible institutions100 were academic
institutions that encompassed both medical and nonmedical schools; I
oversampled hospitals and universities lacking medical schools to ensure adequate
data from these types of institution. The final sample included 20 universities with
98 Leslie E. Wolf et al., Certificates of Confidentiality: Protecting Human Subject Research
Data in Law and Practice, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 594 (2015).
99 Although institutions have procedural freedom to have complaints resolved outside the IRB,
common practice is for this to be a core IRB function, and I thought IRBs would be aware of dispute
resolution practices even if they occurred outside the IRB office.
100 Because this study was funded through the Fordham HIV Prevention Research Ethics
Training Institute, a second part of the interviews specifically considered management of disputes
arising in biomedical HIV prevention research. To fulfill this part of the study, I further limited the
sample to institutions that had received funding from any source within the previous 5 years to
conduct social science research or clinical research on biomedical HIV prevention. I identified
eligible institutions by searching all active protocols in the NIH RePORTER database as of May
2013, clinicaltrials.gov, and consulting trials networks for biomedical HIV prevention research. One
hundred and sixteen unique institutions were eligible for inclusion. I used a computer-generated
random number sequence to select simple random samples of ten institutions at a time for
recruitment. I approached 73 institutions to secure the sample of 30 included interviews; the other 43
institutions either did not respond (35) or declined (8) for reasons including busy schedules or lack
of expertise handling participant complaints. This design introduces some inevitable weaknesses; for
example, there may be some social desirability in responses, and participating institutions may have
been more comfortable discussing their procedures—perhaps because they had better-defined
procedures or fewer negative experiences with research-related disputes. These limitations are
inherent in most qualitative research designs, but they are balanced in this study by the strength of a
simple random sampling procedure among eligible studies, full data saturation on all themes of
interest, and stratification of recruitment across three different types of institution.
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medical schools, 4 universities without medical schools (where almost all
protocols were for social and behavioral research), and 6 hospitals.101 Institutions
were located in all four US Census Bureau regions, and the sizes of their research
portfolios ranged from 20 to more than 5,000 active protocols enrolling human
subjects.
I did not include external or centralized (independent) IRBs; although
centralized IRBs approve research protocols (and may experience liability for
negligent approvals), they have different liabilities from institutions who receive
funds from research sponsors, employ investigators and research staff, and provide
material support and physical space for study activities. I also did not focus on
private industries; although drug and device manufacturers conduct human
subjects protocols, they also may have a somewhat different set of liabilities as
manufacturers. They also often rely on centralized IRBs, or may subcontract trials
to hospitals or clinics. Limiting the scope of this project to hospitals and
universities provides a first cut at the question of how research institutions resolve
complaints and injuries involving human subjects, and subsequent work should
focus on other research settings.
Each interview lasted 60-90 minutes and focused on the types and frequency
of complaints, experiences with litigation involving human subjects, the
development and application of ADR procedures for resolving research-related
disputes, the need for guidance or training to handle research-related disputes, and
the principal values or priorities of the institutional ADR processes.102 I conducted
and audio-recorded all interviews, then analyzed verbatim transcripts thematically
using NVivo 11, which allows the application of a formal coding structure to
qualitative data. I used an initial set of planned codes for data analysis, but added
new themes as they emerged from the data.
101 This sample size is appropriate for the collection of nuanced, in-depth data that explores
variation and meaning in experiences, and it allows for data saturation. See Janice M. Morse,
Determining Sample Size. 10 QUALITATIVE HEALTH RES. 3 (2000); Janice M. Morse, The
Significance of Saturation, 5 QUALITATIVE HEALTH RES. 147 (1995). Data saturation refers to having
collected sufficiently rich data to understand the key relationships at stake in the study—that is,
collecting data until no new themes emerge with additional interviews—and although no formal
metrics of saturation exist, qualitative researchers monitor their findings throughout studies to ensure
that they research saturation before concluding data collection. See Morse, The Significance of
Saturation; see also CONSTRUCTING GROUNDED THEORY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE THROUGH
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS (Kathy Charmaz, ed. 2006). I monitored for data saturation throughout this
work by completing and transcribing a debriefing after each interview, then rereading debriefing
reports to identify new and recurring themes. The final sample enabled a thorough exploration of the
themes of this paper.
102 Each individual participant provided informed consent to interviews, completed an
interview by phone, and received $100 for their time. To protect institutions that may be experiencing
research-related litigation, informed consent used an anonymous verbal process, and all data were
deidentified before analysis.
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Table 1 reports information on the individual informants, while Table 2
reports information about the institutions they represented.
Table 1. Characteristics of individual respondents
Characteristic
Position
Director
Manager
Chair or Administrative Chair
Administrator
Gender
Female
Male
Median Time in Current Position
Median Time in Research Protections
Median Time Managing Complaints
Highest Degree
B.A./B.S.
M.A./M.S.
J.D.
M.B.A.
Ph.D./M.D.
Certified IRB Professional (C.I.P.) Qualification
Currently Certified
Previously Certified
Lapsed
Not Known

Percentage (n = 31)
77%
13%
6%
3%
74%
26%
4.5 years (range 0.25-25 years)
12 years (range 2-25 years)
9 years (range 1-25 years)
16%
39%
6%
10%
29%
42%
10%
32%
16%

B. Frequency and Types of Disputes
Despite a wide and colorful variety of complaints that encompassed injuries,
noncompliance, human resources issues, unwanted recruitment efforts, and
cultural concerns, the overall frequency of complaints was far lower than might be
expected. This low frequency was surprising to many informants, who sought to
explain low system uptake as not only a result of good research practices, but also
a result of subjects’ lack of understanding of their rights, interests, and dispute
resolution options.
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Table 2. Characteristics of institutions.
Characteristic
Type of Institution
University with Affiliated Hospital
University without Hospital
Hospital
U.S. Census Region
Northeast
West
South
Midwest
Other
AAHRPP Accreditation
Current
Pending
Not Accredited
Not Known
Median Active Protocols
Median Annual Complaints per 1,000 protocols
Written Policy or Procedure for Complaint Resolution
Previously Experienced Litigation Involving Human Subjects
Policy for Compensating Subjects for Physical Injury
Compensated Some or All Injuries
Compensated Depending on Sponsor Agreements
Never Compensated
Uncertain

Percentage (n = 30)
67%
13%
20%
40%
23%
20%
13%
3%
50%
10%
37%
3%
2,000 (range 205,000)
2.2 (range 0-43.5)
73%
30%
47%
30%
17%
7%

1. Uptake of the Process
At all but one institution, the IRBs were listed as the resources for participant
complaints on patients’ informed consent forms; the remaining institution
provided participants with information for a patient relations office, which reported
any “non-trivial” complaints back to the IRB. Institutions handled between 20 and
5000 protocols; the largest research programs were at universities that included
medical schools, while hospitals and universities without medical schools had
smaller research programs. Given the variety and commonplace nature of potential
participant complaints noted above, the numbers of complaints received by IRBs
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were surprisingly low, at an average of approximately 5 complaints per year per
thousand active protocols. This figure reflects several outliers with larger numbers
of complaints; the median complaint frequency was 2 complaints per year, per
thousand active protocols. Complaints were somewhat more frequent at
universities with medical schools (median 2.4 per year per thousand protocols),
compared to universities without medical schools (median 0.5) and hospitals
(median 1.8). Several institutions noted temporary spikes in complaints linked to
identifiable events (e.g., media coverage of a protocol using an emergency
exception to informed consent), but the stable frequency of complaints was around
2-5 complaints per thousand protocols per year.103 Complaints were not spilling
over into litigation instead; approximately one third of the institutions had been
involved in litigation involving research subjects or staff, but these incidents were
far less frequent than the number of complaints received.
This Part will explore potential causes for the low frequency of complaints
below. The low figures observed here align, however, with fields such as medical
malpractice and complaints about healthcare professionals, in which “most people
choose to ‘lump’ their grievance (i.e., put up with it or ignore it) or to avoid
expressing it by ‘exiting’ (abandoning or limiting) the troublesome relationship. In
the medical context . . . the vast majority of patients do not sue for negligently
caused injuries . . . . Studies of complaining and claiming behavior are, therefore,
studies of atypical behavior.”104
2. Subject Matter of Complaints: Rights and Interests
Despite this low uptake, when subjects do use the process, the subject matter
of their complaints varies widely and encompasses both legally cognizable and
non-justiciable claims. Complaints are typically brought by subjects themselves,
or family members of participants who are minors, participants who have
diminished capacity to consent, and participants who are ill or deceased. Study
staff may also bring complaints as whistleblowers, particularly when complaints
concern the conduct of principal investigators. I did not include here complaints
from principal investigators about IRB actions; many institutions reported these,
but because my focus is on research subject disputes, they were outside the focus
of this study.
Most institutions reported that complaints about the speed and adequacy of
103 This is lower than a 2011 AAHRPP study that reported an average of 7.9 complaints per
year per thousand protocols, among 193 AAHRPP-accredited institutions. My study included
institutions with and without AAHRPP accreditation; the average for AAHRPP-accredited
institutions was 4.0 complaints per year per thousand protocols. AAHRPP, Metrics on Human
Research Protection Program Performance (2011).
104 Jost, supra note 29, at 314
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participant compensation are most prevalent, particularly for participants enrolling
in non-therapeutic protocols (who may be more interested in compensation, rather
than receiving an experimental intervention). Other complaints include concerns
about the availability and adequacy of the informed consent process (especially for
non-English speakers, minors, or elderly participants); waivers of informed
consent or HIPAA authorization; data privacy and confidentiality; the release of
research reports or publications that did not protect participant confidentiality;
disrespectful, nonresponsive, harassing, discriminatory, or dismissive treatment by
research staff; staff noncompliance with study protocols; sexual harassment by
research staff; dissatisfaction with emergency procedures for managing
psychological events during research studies (e.g., threats of suicide); study
requests for personal identifiers, especially Social Security numbers; unexpected,
painful, or offensive study activities; requests for the return of biological samples;
requests to discontinue participation; student concerns about the use of educational
records; complaints about physical accessibility of study premises for individuals
with disabilities; anger about premature study termination, where studies had been
stopped by researchers, sponsors or the IRB; requests for access to individual study
results or other records; concerns about future use of study samples or data; adverse
social or legal consequences of participating in study procedures;105
malfunctioning equipment or technology provided by a study; and cleanliness of
study facilities. Complaints also include physical injuries, particularly where
participants believe they had not received a timely and thorough response from the
investigative team.
Almost all institutions reported additional complaints from individuals not
enrolled in research protocols. These complaints include community objections to
study advertising (e.g., concerns about how study posters depict LGBT
individuals); concerns about study recruitment and consent processes where
sensitive protocols have received media attention; frustration with being found
ineligible for participation in a particular study (particularly for patients who want
access to a therapeutic protocol), or being excluded from a study midway through
due to noncompliance or changes in eligibility; complaints that studies are wasting
money on answering trivial or obvious research questions; concerns about repeated
requests for study participation after refusal; student concerns about pressure to
participate in professors’ research; complaints from community organizers about
a mismatch between expected and actual research activities in the populations they
represent; complaints about researchers’ misuse of access to medical records
105 For example, one protocol enrolled a sex worker in an HIV vaccine trial, which causes the
body to produce HIV antibodies despite the absence of infection. These antibodies caused her to test
positive in an HIV antibody test when she was later arrested for prostitution, which triggered
mandatory name-based reporting to the state and possibly enhanced penalties for the prostitution
offense.
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databases; and concerns from patients who were angry that the IRB had not yet
approved a research protocol that they perceived to be beneficial. Some
particularly sensitive complaints from non-participants also included concerns
about culture, reputation, or identity; for example, complaints alleged that research
results would harm the reputation of a community or organization, or that
researchers were making inappropriate use of biological samples to study a Native
American community.
Numerous institutions had received complaints from individuals who had
been identified and contacted as potential subjects on the basis of their medical
records or a state registry (e.g., asked to be in a prostate cancer study because their
medical records included a prostate cancer diagnosis), which did not fit their
expectations of medical record privacy. Institutions who reported these complaints
had almost universally enacted institutional policy changes barring investigators
from cold-calling participants on the basis of their medical records.
C. Process Goals and Values
Despite the heterogeneity across institutions in location, type of institution,
and size, there were remarkable similarities in how institutions viewed their
proximate goals and underlying process values. This Section will discuss each in
turn, noting similarities in how informants described their systems.
1. Proximate Goals
Informants reflected on a number of institutional goals for their dispute
resolution systems. These goals included system outputs that are separable (and
often measurable) results of the process (e.g., participant satisfaction), as well as a
common set of desirable procedural features (e.g., neutrality of the decision-maker,
transparency).
Most informants noted that the IRB’s institutional role is to protect subjects
enrolled in research protocols; the quality of decisions depended on how well they
fulfilled this substantive goal, in addition to complying with federal regulations
and ethical guidance. For these institutions, complaints are a source of feedback
for modifying risky protocols or practices, and the resolution process sometimes
led to system-level changes to policies applying across the institution.106 Subject
and investigator satisfaction with the process—if not the outcome—is also a
primary goal at all institutions, and informants often described “customer
satisfaction” or a “consumer service” approach for subjects as an overriding
emphasis. As expected, another salient goal of this process is to protect the
institution itself from litigation and adverse media exposure, in part by satisfying
106 See Sturm & Gadlin, supra note 34.
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individual subjects’ concerns, but also by maintaining an active feedback loop that
identifies systemic risks. IRBs noted that individual or repeated complaints can
identify defects in institutional policies, providing opportunities for revision and
reform. As one informant noted, “The most important thing is to ensure the patient
is, feels comfortable in the resolution . . . I guess secondly would be to ensure that
we’ve implemented whatever processes need to happen to ensure it doesn’t happen
again.” Or as another said, “[We have] more policy-type resolutions so that I can
go back to [an] individual and say . . . the institution has now changed its policy in
a way this will not happen again . . . . A quality resolution . . . is not just a quick
band-aid fix, but more of a long-term, proactive [step].”
Like many ADR processes, these systems aim for efficiency, speed, and
accuracy, in part assured by the procedural flexibility inherent in the system
design.107 Speed was often cited as a goal of complaint resolution, with multiple
informants noting that lengthy complaint processes may foster escalation of the
dispute, particularly if parties are not kept abreast of progress. Consistency was
another procedural goal, often fostered by written or standardized procedures.
Conserving financial and administrative costs, however, was not typically a
priority, and the costs of the ADR process were viewed as small in comparison to
the threat of litigation and reputational exposures for the institution. Informants
reported willingness to devote considerable time and resources to complaints in
the interests of accuracy and fairness, and the low number of complaints enabled
IRBs to prioritize thoroughness over administrative costs. (“As far as time,
manpower, and all of that is concerned, I think you have to spend what you have
to spend in order to make it a fair process.”) Moreover, very few complainants
sought financial compensation for their grievances, with the exception of
participants with uncompensated injuries or complaints related to expected
payment for study activities.
In order to fulfill these proximate goals, institutions sought to create processes
with a number of ideal safeguards. These included an easily accessible forum;
having a written procedure or having the same personnel respond to all complaints;
a full opportunity for subjects and investigators to provide their version of the facts,
including in-person or phone meetings with the IRB; options for the subject to elect
anonymity or choose not to pursue corrective action; an opportunity for parties to
choose facilitated negotiation or mediation; an initial triage point that allows for
emergency actions such as study suspension; transparency about the process and
communication of the outcome to investigators and subjects; provision of a thirdparty neutral with the authority to issue decisions that bind the institution;
consultation of all complaint stakeholders and institutional actors, including
trusted members of the subject’s community where relevant; privacy of
107 See infra, Section III.E.
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deliberations and decisions by the third-party neutral; a thorough fact-finding
process that consults all relevant parties; a written, reasoned decision;
opportunities for the investigator to weigh in on the corrective action plan; and an
option to appeal.
2. Values of the Process
Informants’ beliefs about the underlying value of a complaint resolution
process reflected many, if not all, of the process values described in Part II above.
The value of participation resonated most deeply throughout the interviews, both
as an instrumental value (necessary to reach a resolution, promote legitimacy, or
defuse conflict) and as an inherent value (an independent good for subjects who
exert their autonomy by complaining). Informants intuitively described some
themes arising in the procedural justice literature, such as an “opportunity to be
heard” (voice); the need to treat participants empathetically and respectfully
(courtesy); the need to provide a forum that approximates a neutral third party
(neutrality); and the need for the IRB to be trustworthy or receive buy-in from
trusted community authorities (trust). Procedures that involve all possible
stakeholders to a complaint also advance participation values, and may also
increase the legitimacy of both the forum and the substantive decisions made by
the IRBs.
Equality between the subject and investigator is a second value, given IRB’s
efforts to provide neutral decisions and full participation opportunities for both
sides. Accountability of the investigator for wrongs was an important corollary to
this principle; importantly, however, this accountability is one-sided. Although the
IRBs can compel investigators to take corrective actions, they have neither the
authority nor the desire to sanction subjects. Of course, a final IRB decision that is
adverse to the subject forecloses other options, particularly for non-justiciable
complaints. But subjects cannot be made worse off ex post. The focus of
accountability was also on individual investigators rather than the institution more
generally, save for physical injuries (which may be compensated by institutional
funds) and complaints that specifically alleged misconduct elsewhere in the
institution (e.g., negligent approval of protocols by the IRB itself).
Informants’ focus on consistency and the need for procedural transparency
with complainants and investigators suggested that predictability was an important
goal. Informants did not, however, identify the need to provide procedural
information to subjects before the act of bringing a complaint. Indeed, very little
about the process was disclosed ex ante, in part because IRBs maintained so much
procedural discretion that precise procedural details were not known in advance.
As overseers of the informed consent process, IRBs are well acquainted with the
problems of how best to disclose information to research subjects. The difficulties
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of obtaining informed consent are notorious.108 Limited time is available for
obtaining informed consent; participants may already be overwhelmed with
information about the details of the research protocol; and the informed consent
process often fails to present information in an accessible way. Prior studies have
consistently found deficiencies in informed consent. One review found that
participants lacked adequate comprehension of the study in 29% of research
protocols, and lacked comprehension of the risks of surgery in 36% of surgical
research protocols.109 Participants in only 44% of protocols knew that they could
withdraw from the study.110 Studies worldwide have found similar results, showing
that comprehension varies widely, and that randomization and placebo-controlled
trials present particular stumbling blocks for comprehension.111 When it is already
difficult to present significant facts about the research protocol in an accessible
way, researchers may be limited in their ability to disclose detailed procedural
information about participants’ dispute resolution options. Against this backdrop,
informants in the present study generally had not questioned the current practice
of disclosing IRBs’ contact information without further details about the dispute
resolution process.
Informants were less likely to describe privacy as an independent value, with
the exception of privacy for investigators who experience disciplinary sanctions.
Instead, procedures safeguarded privacy interests in an effort to promote
participation values, particularly in the use of procedures to receive and manage
complaints made by subjects who wished to stay anonymous or confidential. No
informant described using a formal confidentiality or nondisclosure agreement
during the process, but internal deliberations of the IRB were wholly confidential
as an institutional practice.
Finally, a number of legitimacy interests were served by a well-functioning
complaint process. These included the legitimacy of the IRBs’ substantive
decisions about complaints, but also legitimacy of the institution, particularly in its
relationships with research communities, as well as the legitimacy of science more
generally, as some later quotes will demonstrate. As one informant noted, “We
protect human subjects and we facilitate research at the institution, because
research with human subjects does improve healthcare at the end of the day . . . .
it’s important that our institution be trusted to have the best interest of our patients
and you know, um, society in the research that we’re doing.”
108 Christine Grady, Enduring and Emerging Challenges of Informed Consent, 372 N. ENGL.
J. MED. 855 (2015); Tom L. Beauchamp, Informed Consent: Its History, Meaning, and Present
Challenges, 20 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 515 (2011).
109 Falagas, supra note 7.
110 Id.
111 Amulya Mandava, et al., The Quality of informed Consent: Mapping the Landscape. A
Review of Empirical Data from Developing and Developed Countries, 38 J. MED. ETHICS 356 (2012).
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In addition to these intuitive process values, some informants also sought to
advance the values of the Belmont Report on ethical research with human subjects.
These particularly included respect for subjects’ autonomy and the need for
beneficence and non-maleficence toward research subjects. These values might be
reclassified into the interests above, such as dignity and equality—but the Belmont
Report is unique to the lopsided power structures in the research setting, and may
be less instructive for other types of IDR.
D. Elements of Process
Despite the lack of regulatory guidance on how institutions should handle
research-related disputes—which might be expected to generate some
heterogeneity in dispute system design—almost all institutions have developed
similar and procedurally flexible dispute resolution systems. Even where some
institutions differ slightly (e.g., a few hold institutional insurance for subject
injuries; a few request local community leader involvement for disputes arising in
foreign or culturally distinct groups; a few have a patient representative), the
contours of the basic process remain the same. Although this may result in part
from the process of AAHRPP accreditation, AAHRPP does not mandate particular
dispute system design features, and even the institutions that were not accredited
handle disputes similarly. This Section will therefore group all types of institutions
together for the analysis.
Across institutions, complaint resolution processes most commonly resembles
binding arbitration for disputes that are not the result of a factual misunderstanding.
For minor disputes arising solely from a misunderstanding or miscommunication,
the process may be more similar to facilitated negotiation or even simple
education. All processes are developed and managed internally by the IRB, and
they rely on the IRB to issue binding decisions as a third-party neutral vis a vis the
participant and investigator. Processes follow a rough timeline of complaint
receipt, internal discussion of procedural options, “fact-finding” carried out
directly by the IRB or a research compliance team, deliberation by the IRB, and
issuance of a binding, written resolution enforced by the IRB’s authority to
approve or disapprove the research protocol. The remainder of this Section will
consider the origins of these processes, procedural similarities across institutions,
and the chronological series of steps in the process.
1. IRB as Dispute System Designer: Process Origins and Design
Almost all the institutional processes in this study arose informally within the
IRB and solidified over time, as IRBs received specific, but rare complaint calls
from research subjects. Where institutions had an ex ante process, it was typically
created as part of a broader reorganization of the IRB, or it was imported by a new
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director or chair familiar with a process from a previous institution. A minority of
institutions had no written process for managing complaints; they considered this
an “office practice,” or believed that they experienced too few complaints per year
to require a written procedure (“I mean it happens maybe five times a year so, uh,
knock on wood”). The likelihood of having a written policy differed little
depending on the type of institution (hospitals, universities with or without medical
schools). These written procedures were internal, and although several institutions
post them internally, none described making them available to research subjects at
the time of enrollment. No institution mentioned consulting subjects or subject
representatives systematically at the time of process design.112
Where institutions had written procedures, most had developed them to fulfill
the requirements set by AAHRPP.113 Many, but not all, had consulted other
institutions’ policies at the time of accreditation. Informants at other institutions,
including non-accredited programs, noted that they had developed written policies
unprompted to increase efficiency (“[Before our written procedure,] not everybody
was consistent, things were getting missed.”), and to increase consistency across
protocols and over time (“I think that’s your biggest, you know, benefit is making
sure that everything is handled in a fair, unbiased, consistent manner.”).114 The
central goals of process standardization were to ensure similar treatment across all
participants and investigators, and to reduce biased procedural decisions that may
arise from prior knowledge of the investigator.
Whenever an issue came up that we needed to resolve, we realized
that we shouldn’t do it ad hoc, you know depending on the PI
[principal investigator]. If we knew the PI was a good guy to do
one thing versus, um, doing something else. So we, we realized
back then you’re much better off to have upfront processes put
into place -- to treat everyone the same -- and go down the same
algorithm of decisions -- versus a hit or miss, which is you know
what we were doing before we had the SOP [statement of
procedure] in place.
It’s really important to us as an institution and as an office
112 One institution did, however, involve a patient representative throughout the process and
involved that person in the process design.
113 Eighteen of the thirty institutions were accredited or pending accreditation, including all six
hospitals, 12 of the universities with medical schools, and none of the universities without medical
schools.
114 One institution had also interpreted the federal regulations and OHRP guidance on
mandatory reporting of unanticipated problems to require a written process for resolving complaints,
in the event that complaints alleged such problems or noncompliance. Other institutions, however,
had not interpreted the regulations this way.
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specifically that we want to set precedent. Like we want to treat
each case as very similar, we want to have a very similar outcome
and so if we determine that we have a different outcome, we want
to look at why . . . . There are investigators that have, uh, have
kind of proven themselves to be very quality investigators, and
then certainly I think every institution has investigators that are
known to be a little bit less by the book . . . . But if the same
complaint came in, the equivalent complaint came in under the
same two, you know, under these two investigators, they should
be handled exactly the same with the same neutral approach.
Both those with written and unwritten procedures, however, believed that a
written procedure would be important in the event that a subject complaint resulted
in litigation. For example, one institution without a written procedure suggested
that they may be “at risk for not having it more codified . . . . But, you know,
usually something bad has to happen and then you become codified.” An
institution with a standard written process noted that a key motivation was the
belief that own compliance with internal procedures would have value in litigation.
Some complaints . . . were bypassing [the director’s] office and
going right to [the IRB] committee. And they were meritless. And
then there were other complaints that would come to me but there
was no formal process -- there was no standard operating
procedure . . . . And so we just codified the, um, process flow . . . .
You know, if it did get to litigation we -- we could say that we
were or were not following our own internal policies. So [we
shifted] from no policy to policy. Based on experience, we knew
what worked and what wasn’t working. We knew where
exposures were . . . legal exposures, regulatory exposures.
Most institutions noted that they continued to revise and update their processes
over time, to respond to changes in complaints or the institutional environment
(“We learn what works and what doesn’t work and what’s more efficient for the
participant and the study team . . . . It’s a continual learning basis.”). Whether
procedures were written or unwritten, however, basic procedural features and
proximate process goals were similar across institutions, and all relied on the IRB
as a third-party neutral, as the next sections will note.
2. IRB as Complaint Line: Initial Contact
All IRBs provide their contact information to subjects via the informed
consent form, or if a verbal informed consent process is used, subjects receive
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independent notice of the IRB contact information. Most subjects communicate
complaints by phone, although some IRBs noted receiving isolated complaints by
email or (sometimes-anonymous) written letter or email, and these IRBs responded
by phone if possible. Phone calls may direct to a general office, but they are then
redirected to a single person such as the director, administrator, chair, or manager
of the IRB.115 Institutions that received complaints through other channels, such as
those going to the president or provost’s office in a university, typically referred
these back to the IRB. Most institutions do not require a written complaint; instead,
the IRB personnel prepares a written description on behalf of the subject at the
time of the call, and some fill out standard forms during the call to ensure that they
are obtaining all the relevant information.
Almost without exception, the informants emphasized the importance of the
initial conversation with an aggrieved subject. The immediate goals of this
conversation are to obtain a detailed description of the complaint, to identify the
relevant protocol and investigator, to identify any previous efforts to resolve the
complaint with the investigator, to identify threats of violence or psychological
needs, and to understand the remedy that the subject was requesting, if any. But at
the time of first contact, IRBs also seek to provide the subject with a full
opportunity to voice their complaint without interruption, to ensure that the subject
feels heard and respected, to express respect and empathy, and to convey that the
subject has been heard by someone who has the institutional authority to resolve
the dispute.
The number one thing we’re trying to do is to listen, even if we
don’t get a complete understanding of the complaint, I mean,
that’s another goal, but the most important thing is that the person
on the other end hangs up the phone feeling that they were heard.
They want to get to somebody right away, without having to go
through lots of different people, who has the authority and
responsibility to listen to them and to, who can help them. So
that’s number one. And then number two, our perception is that,
uh, they want somebody who’s going to listen, um, in an
empathetic way.
The primary goal actually is to ensure that the subject feels heard.
To make sure that whoever is calling, whatever the concern is, that
they have some hope that in fact, uh, someone is going to take
their call seriously. And while we obviously cannot, uh, promise
to the caller that whatever resolution happens will be done, you
115 Several forms also provide numbers for multiple contacts at the IRB, in cases where the
IRB chairs also conduct research and may have complaints arising in their own research studies.
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know, to his or her satisfaction -- we can at least reassure the caller
that, um, they’ve, they’ve reached someone who is going to help
them.
I want to, um, allow them to tell their story . . . being, you know,
caring and, um, respectful . . . . I would confirm back to them that,
you know, we understand that it’s upsetting to them . . . . Once
I’ve heard from them I like to clarify back to them what I heard
and what my understanding is of their concern . . . [I’m] making
it clear that their concerns have been heard and understood. People
really need to be heard.
Informants noted that hearing the subject could serve instrumental reasons—
it can help defuse emotions and ensure that the process is responsive, and
sometimes having a voice fulfills the subject’s entire goal in complaining (“Some
people will call and say, you know, here’s my grief, but at the end of the day they
just want to vent and don’t really want me to follow up with that, and don’t want
to leave their name and number.”). Informants also noted, however, that this also
serves inherent values that might be described as dignity interests, at least in our
taxonomy of process values—here, these interests include the desire to be “taken
seriously” and to have someone in power acknowledge the emotional impact of
the perceived wrong. These expressions of empathy can also promote legitimacy
of the process and institution, as one informant noted:
Usually if they know that you’re concerned about them . . . this
reflects on us as much as anybody else. We want research to be
done ethically. We want all research participants to feel like they
can come to us with any um concern or complaint and so I usually
reassure them to let them know that we take every complaint
seriously, that we’ll investigate it, and we’ll work with them until
the problem is resolved.
3. IRB as Communicator: Ongoing Communications with Participants and
Investigators
At the time of initial contact, most institutions also offer participants some
input on process and offer procedural safeguards. All institutions offer subjects the
opportunity to make their complaint anonymously, without disclosing their
identity at all, or confidentially, without disclosing their identity to the
investigator.116 (They note, however, that anonymity or confidentiality may limit
116 One institution even maintains a fully anonymous, non-staffed phone line that anonymizes
calls, for people who wish to leave a message without any link to their identity.
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the options for resolutions in complaints regarding compensation, investigator
misconduct, or harassment.) IRBs typically give participants the option to continue
the process toward resolution or corrective action, or to stop the process after the
initial call. One IRB member noted that giving the participant this flexibility was
an important part of respect for autonomy, which is a core principle of the Belmont
Report ethical guidance for research. In the dispute resolution context, this aligns
with the broader dignitary and participatory values of process.
If they, if they want it to just be a venting session, I’m here to
listen. But if they, if they do need some additional follow-up I
wanna make sure that they have the control as much as is
appropriate . . . . Research again is not . . . your standard clinical
treatment . . . . Our participants are volunteering to be in this
research, that they’re not compelled, and I think it’s important that
we respect and honor their contributions to the research. They can
withdraw at any time and I, I guess it’s just part of the respect of
persons, kind of getting back to that ethical principle, um, in the
Belmont Re[port that I think is, is important.
Another recurring theme throughout these interviews was the need to maintain
continuous contact with participants and investigators, including informing them
of the steps of the process as they occur. Informants viewed this communication
channel as in part an extension of voice and the value of participation, as well as
serving broader dignity goals; as one informant noted, “It’s important to be
transparent . . . . it usually turns out to be much worse if you don’t keep the, the
complainant in the loop so that they feel like they’re actually being listened to . . .
I think transparency and neutrality are more important because I’m not really sure
there is such a thing as the right resolution.” Some IRBs set frequencies for recontacting subjects and investigators during a complaint, such as making contact
on a weekly basis.
Informants also noted the need for transparency of process to improve
satisfaction among both investigators and subjects. One informant, for example,
described a change in practice to discontinue an informal process that was “never
really clear on the policy” and “would cherry-pick what they wanted to do.” In
their new process, “if somebody had a complaint we would send an email and
explain what our steps are going to be [to the subject] and a researcher if we were
going to audit them . . . we tr[y] to be user-friendly and have clear understanding
of what the role is and what’s going to happen . . . and it’s made the situation
better.” Another agreed that transparency directly affects perceived legitimacy:
“Communication in really key . . . in order to be transparent . . . . I think even in
the tough situations most people are respectful of how you undertake the process,
knowing that it is a difficult process.”
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IRBs are aware that the stakes of complaints are high for investigators,
particularly when subjects express concern about the investigators’ own conduct
or noncompliance. As one informant noted, researchers are “typically in a
defensive stance” during complaints. Transparency of process was viewed as an
important safeguard for investigators, who may also have more notice of IRB
practices through investigator training, repeated interactions with the system, or
access to internal institutional policy documents. Information about process can
also alleviate investigators’ feelings of being wrongly accused or the target of bias,
as one informant noted: “We have to let them know that we have to investigate
every single call regardless of feelings, regardless of anything . . . and a lot of times
they know it’s a process that we have to go through.”
4. IRB as Mediator: Process Selection and Resolution of Minor Complaints
After the initial contact, the IRB director or manager makes a preliminary
determination about the severity and likely veracity of the complaint.117 Where
there are urgent or emergency issues involving risks to subjects, the most senior
IRB official (the chair) or a subcommittee of the IRB will immediately assemble
and recommend emergency measures, such as suspending study activities. But for
most types of minor complaints, the IRB personnel will begin by contacting the
principal investigator of the research study by phone or email, to identify whether
the complaint can be easily resolved. Many complaints are easily classified as
minor issues that can be resolved via communication between the subject and
principal investigator (e.g., missing compensation), or via a direct, second
conversation with the individual (e.g., explaining why the person was not eligible
for a particular protocol). The IRB director, manager, or chair typically takes these
actions directly,118 notifying the principal investigator or re-contacting the
complainant to explain features of the study or informed consent form. A number
of IRB chairs noted a practice of directly facilitating conversations between
subjects and investigators, with the chair personally serving as a third-party
mediator to ensure that the communication went smoothly.
[I] try to set up a, you know, a meeting between them and the
investigator so they can address these issues . . . . Most conflicts I
think it’s best when everybody is sitting down and talking to each
other . . . . That’s one of our first outreaches with any sort of
problem, whether it’s just an investigator or a study problem, is to
117 Several informants noted that concerns about veracity can be particularly important for
complaints arising in psychiatric studies. “A lot of the complaints may also be from psychiatric
patients . . . . So I sort of probe how closely their complaint is grounded in reality.”
118 Where subjects report not having spoken with the investigator yet, many IRBs will suggest
that the subject do so directly before proceeding.
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try to get everybody in the same room and talk about it. If it looks
like it’s a problem that could be solved by just people talking to
each other or looking at what the different options are, that’s
always, that’s always our first approach.
The time to resolution for these minor complaints is typically hours or days,
and multiple informants described the procedure in these cases as a “customer
service” approach, centered on listening and the subject’s desire to be heard.
5. IRB as Fact-Finder: Iterative Investigation and Consultation for Serious
Complaints
Where complaints do not arise from miscommunication or misunderstanding,
however, the process escalates to resemble arbitration, in which the IRB takes on
both a fact-finding and adjudicatory role and imposes a resolution that is enforced
by institutional authority over the research protocol. The IRB chair, along with any
other IRB personnel who initially received the complaint, makes a preliminary
classification of the issues, rights, and individuals at stake, and determines whether
other institutional actors should be involved in the resolution process. Where the
IRB reports to an additional institutional authority, such as the vice president or
chancellor for research, the IRB personnel will likely include this person in the
decision about involving other departments.
Depending on the nature of the complaint, the IRB may choose to involve a
wide array of offices or personnel within the institution. The role of these personnel
is typically to provide guidance or to assist in fact-finding. These may include the
institution’s general counsel (for complaints that include legal claims, injuries, or
potential legal violations, such as failures of informed consent or HIPAA
violations), any insurance program for research-related injury, the human
resources office for complaints involving whistleblowers or investigator
misconduct, the risk management office, the regulatory affairs department, FERPA
officials, the office for privacy and HIPAA, media affairs (for disputes receiving
media attention), institutional officials serving as research subject advocates or
patient advocates, university ombudsmen, campus police or security for disputes
where subjects or investigators may threaten violence, institutional officials for
sponsored projects, and departmental heads or chairs of the investigator’s
department. All dispute resolution processes for complaints alleging
noncompliance with protocols will also involve a compliance team, which may be
a subcommittee of the IRB, a single IRB officer such as a quality improvement
officer, or a separate arm of the broader human research protection program.
The IRB chair and other institutional officials may also gauge whether the
complaint requires contacts with people outside the university—for example,
research sponsors who may need to approve protocol changes, local police who
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were arresting participants leaving a study for sex workers, a state agency that had
made a name-based registry of cancer patients available to researchers, a local
school board for a dispute about informed consent for school-based research, or a
tribal council for a dispute over the return of biological samples to tribe members.
IRBs also work with foreign IRBs, for international research protocols that require
review by institutions in multiple countries.
After identifying the relevant stakeholders, rights, and interests, the IRB
typically begins a flexible and sometimes iterative process of fact-finding,
consideration of facts and interests, and communication with the investigator,
research staff, participant, and other institutional or outside actors. The fact-finding
process may include a formal audit of study materials or less formal interviews
with the investigator and study staff. The IRB may conduct this process itself
through a subcommittee or individual staff members;119 it may also use a
compliance office or risk management team.120 The process can last up to six
months or even a year for complicated or contentious disputes, but more typically
lasts about one month.
6. IRB as Client: Outsourcing Disputes
During consultation with other institutional stakeholders, senior members of
the institution may decide to reallocate control of the dispute resolution process to
legal counsel or human resources departments. Where this occurs, the IRB loses
jurisdiction over the dispute. “[If] the institution wants to move forward with it or
take it to a different level or address that we kind of bow out from a jurisdiction
perspective.”
Even when the IRB retains management of the dispute, however, they may
rely on institutions’ legal counsel for guidance, interpretation of applicable
institutional policies or external regulations, or communication with research
participants’ counsel. Some informants believed that legal counsel were reliable
supporters and valuable resources for most complaints. But others noted that legal
counsel could actually complicate complaint resolution; their concern for
institutional liability encourages defensive communication with subjects, rather
than the empathy and concern that most IRBs thought was the necessary tone to
achieve a resolution.
We don’t necessarily have to bring the attorneys in right from the
beginning, and they don’t drive the process . . . . They’re focused,
119 One hospital also reported having institutional legal counsel attend fact-finding interviews,
“to give [research staff] comfort and reassurance” that they will not be penalized for honest responses.
120 In one dispute concerning the behavior of the IRB itself, the IRB asked another institution’s
IRB to assist in the factfinding and dispute resolution process.
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of course, on protecting the university . . . and that’s great. But
that often is at odds with trying to resolve the participant
complaint. In an ideal world, everybody would agree that
resolving the complaint is not only the right thing to do but will
prevent the litigation. But sometimes those are a little bit at odds
and so we get into sort of a—if the attorneys are prominently
involved—sort of a protective mode where um, we’re not
necessarily free to be as compassionate. Even if we’re not
agreeing with the participant necessarily, we want to be able to
still interact with them in a way that displays empathy and
compassion, and sometimes that can be a little bit of a challenge
when the attorneys are involved.
A few research institutions had instituted a procedural innovation to address
protocols that take place in international or culturally distinctive settings, where
subjects may be uncomfortable with approaching the institution directly. These
institutions sometimes required investigators to appoint a local community leader
to assist in resolving disputes arising in any protocols; this person could liaise
between the subject community and the institution where needed. The community
representative was listed on informed consent forms and became a point of contact
for receiving complaints, and also an active part of the resolution process for any
complaints that rose to the level of the IRB.
We look for an alternate, uh, position in the community, a
trustworthy person in the community to accept those and refer
them to us for handling . . . . It’s all a part of being sensitive to the
population that are being recruited . . . . It includes having a
person in that community who would be perceived as being
impartial and would listen and refer the, the problems and
concerns to us . . . . It can be used in remote, anything that is
remote from our site or which is culturally inaccessible, like an
Indian tribe . . . . [And] for our sake they would be um, um at a
leadership community leadership level that they would in an
informed way communicate with the IRB here.
This institution raises interesting questions about the relationship between the
research institution and the participant population.
7. IRB as Adjudicator: Deliberation, Decisions, and Appeals
When fact-finding is complete, IRBs proceed to deliberation, which remains
internal to the IRB for most types of complaints. Factual findings and the results
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of conversations with various stakeholders are recorded and assembled by the IRB,
along with guidance from other relevant institutional actors. The IRB may
designate a subcommittee or ask the full board to examine the factual findings,
guidance, and interests at stake. This decision body recommends a preliminary
solution that may be acceptable to the parties, including any proposed remedies or
corrective action plans. Many IRBs at this stage will communicate directly with
the principal investigator in advance of the final decision, attempting to find a
voluntary set of protocol corrections or a remediation plan that the investigator
would find feasible and acceptable. Several informants described this process as
prioritizing transparency and participation throughout the crafting of a resolution,
while others noted that unrealistic corrective action plans may undermine the
durability of the resolution:
We do try to be transparent, um, listen to both parties, and then
come to collaborative solutions that would really involve all
parties trying to create the solution . . . . My preference is not to
impose solutions as much as to say, “What would be your solution
given your particular environment that you conduct the study in?”
. . . . Of course, if it’s a regulatory piece then we have no
flexibility, then we tend to impose, but even within that imposition
it would be my style to say, “Well, how is that going to work for
you?”
We work together on a solution that’s more of a learning
experience. We don’t want it to be punitive for either party . . .
especially our PIs because sometimes . . . they didn’t realize they
were doing anything wrong . . . . So depending on the solution, a
lot of times we may involve the PI into the solution.
We don’t want to impose . . . a bunch of strict regulations on a
study team that will in essence make them be noncompliant in the
future if they’re unable to fulfill that corrective or preventive
action plan.
The process concludes with a full IRB decision to approve a corrective action
plan and to formally issue a written letter to the principal investigator, setting forth
the facts and corrective action requirements. IRBs often notify the subject of the
final resolution as well, although the subject does not typically receive a copy of
the same letter. The IRB determines what will be disclosed to the participant at this
time, which may be in writing or by phone, and may contain less detailed
information. As one informant noted, “We may say [an investigator was]
disciplined but we won’t say . . . what the specific disciplinary action was
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because . . . we have to keep in mind the faculty member and the investigator, their
rights.”
According to many informants, the IRB’s authority to make binding decisions
on research-related complaints arises from the federal regulations, which task IRBs
with the approval or disapproval of research protocols. As one informant noted,
“Because our IRB, you know . . . [we] have that federal regulatory mandate to be
the final decision makers . . . even when people appeal [an adverse decision], it
typically doesn’t result in a significant change.”
After the final decision, almost all institutions give the principal investigator
a right to appeal for reconsideration by the chair, the full IRB, a vice president for
research, or the chief medical officer. No institution described making this option
available to the subject, because subjects cannot experience sanctions as a result
of a complaint. But when prompted, many IRBs said that a subject who is
dissatisfied with the resolution of their complaint could likely obtain
reconsideration as well.
Subjects who invoke the dispute resolution process do not give up other legal
remedies; nothing forecloses a public lawsuit after the process ends.121 Informed
consent forms do not require subjects to use the dispute resolution process at the
institution—mandatory arbitration is curiously absent in this context. But because
so many disputes are based on non-justiciable interests rather than legal rights, the
IRB’s decision is typically the only available remedy. Investigators can (and
sometimes do) sue institutions in connection with research-related disputes, but
individual subjects typically are not involved in public investigator-institution
disputes.
8. IRB as Enforcer: Remedies
IRBs noted many options for remedying research-related injuries, all
enforceable by the sanction of closing research protocols that do not comply with
remediation plans. Financial settlements were possible but rare, and the negotiation
of these settlements typically involved legal counsel. Only a small handful of
institutions had a public policy of compensating research-related injuries, either by
insurance or institutional funds; a majority, however, noted that they either paid
for treating injuries at their own facilities, or they eventually provided funds for
treating any research-related injuries that are not covered by subjects’ own health
insurance. This is an important informal policy, given that most consent forms
specifically state that research sponsors and the institution are not obligated to pay
for treating research-related injuries. Informants did not describe apologies as an
available remedy, but noted that subjects did receive explanations of events where
121 It is possible, however, that subjects who receive compensation for injury do need to waive
the ability to sue as a condition of settlement. See Pike article. But these are a minority of cases.
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relevant.
Other remedies include changes to individual protocols, such as mandatory
changes to training and supervision procedures for research staff, changes in
recruitment strategies, changes to the informed consent process, or changes in
criteria for initial or continued eligibility. Some of these protocol changes are
reportable to study sponsors, as are complaints that are determined to arise from
serious adverse events or unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects. IRBs
can also require training or directed education of investigators or staff on issues
like informed consent or record-keeping. For more severe or irremediable
violations, IRBs can terminate studies or entire lines of research, mandate the
destruction or nonuse of data, or require the return of biological samples to
subjects. Where investigations reveal serious or recurring noncompliance,
scientific misconduct, or HR violations, researchers may also experience
professional sanctions or discipline through the HR department.
Some complaints led to thoroughgoing changes in institutional policies, such
as the discontinuation of recruitment practices that involve cold-calling, changed
policies for the supervision of students, a discontinuation of studies that consented
participants under the influence of alcohol, new policies for training researchers
and staff, and changes to institution-wide informed consent practices.
9. IRB as Record-Keeper: Missed Opportunities
Most institutions kept written records of complaints, but these were typically
filed under individual protocols; only a few institutions systematically recorded
complaints using a method that would allow for analysis over time or across
protocols. Feedback from dispute resolution programs could assist IRBs in
identifying research risks and burdens, but IRBs are neglecting this opportunity to
use disputes as information. Ideally, IRBs should record complaints in a manner
that would allow personnel to aggregate or compare issues across protocols. A
periodic analysis of these complaint data could help IRBs anticipate risks and
burdens at the protocol approval stage, rather than waiting for complaints to arise.
IRBs could also use these data to identify recurring complaints arising from
particular departments or protocol types, which could be remedied by
improvements in investigator training or institutional research procedures.
E. The Centrality and Limitations of Procedural Flexibility in IDR
Throughout the interviews, the IRB informants consistently noted the
advantages of a highly flexible complaint resolution process.122 Even where
122 The informality of IRBs’ own protocols, records, and procedures may amuse many
researchers who prepare highly detailed and inflexible protocols to comply with IRB requirements.
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procedures were written, informants described leaving broad latitude to select
among process options, or supplementing the written process to include additional
elements.
We have to have a written policy that we handle complaints, but
we leave it as open as we possibly can, um, we provide a range of
possible responses depending on what the, you know, the level of
severity, etc . . . . You don’t want to lock yourself into having to,
you know, you don’t want to say in your policy we will respond
in writing to all complaints if that’s not appropriate . . . . So you
then leave yourself open to being able to, um, respond in a, you
know, um, issue specific manner that’s appropriate for what’s
going on.
[The process is] just based on the situation at hand . . . . We have
on paper a policy and process . . . . But if we, you know, run into
an obstacle or a snag or, you know, if we needed additional
information, we might make a decision that’s not written
somewhere. But again, only with the same intent, which is . . .
[that] all parties are being, you know, properly addressed, you
know, properly, um, given the proper opportunity to kind of speak.
Informants believed that the principal benefits of procedural flexibility were
the opportunity to tailor the process for complaints with a range of rights and
interests; to involve all relevant institutional and outside personnel in the response;
and to provide full voice to any unforeseeable parties that may have a stake in the
events or their resolution. Some of these benefits serve efficiency—that is,
standardized procedural features may waste time and resources. For example, it is
costly in time and manpower to conduct full audits for complaints that might be
easily resolved through facilitated negotiation. These efficiency benefits may
indirectly serve the value of participation, by freeing up time and attention for more
resource-intensive complaints. As informants described it, however, procedural
flexibility also directly serves participation and legitimacy by promoting voice and
inclusion of all parties. Informants believed it would be costly to legitimacy,
destructive to community relations, or corrosive to the durability of a resolution if
processes exclude stakeholders beyond the subject and investigators—as in the
examples involving tribal leadership, community-based organization, school
boards, or local trusted officials in overseas protocols. The procedural flexibility
embedded in these ADR systems allow for the involvement of all relevant
stakeholders on a case-by-case basis, which informants commonly described as a
Flexibility, however, serves several key values in the IDR process, as this Section suggests.
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procedural goal. As one informant noted:
Each situation almost is unique . . . . And the biggest principle that
we try to follow that’s sort of a general principle . . . is to spend a
lot of time being absolutely certain that we have consulted with
all the appropriate parties . . . . And that means at information
gathering, identification of an appropriate, uh, resolution and
action plan, and then conducting and carrying out that action plan,
and then closing the loop when the whole thing is done. So that’s
kind of the general principle that we do that is common to all the
complaints . . . because we’ve had some real problems when that
didn’t happen.
Many informants stressed that a standardized process would be inadequate to
handle complaints, and some believed that the interpersonal skills of the dispute
processors are likely more important for a thorough resolution, compared to the
process elements itself.
These complaints are as variable as there are people . . . . I’m
wondering if you could or whoever develops this could come up
with enough of a cookbook or a recipe, um, that it’s going to be
applicable to the next five cases that came in the door . . . . Some
of it depends on who you have handling [complaints], just how
adept they are at dealing with people, um, more than
processes . . . . I don’t know that this is going to be an area that
just immediately lends itself to here’s, here’s, here’s the one
template or recipe you can all follow and apply this to every
complaint you get
But despite the virtues of procedural flexibility, informants also noted that a
flexible process introduced complexity, unpredictability, bias, and difficulty in
passing on institutional knowledge. Informants noted that flexibility may lead to a
lack of transparency and inconsistency.
I think a strength is our flexibility or the nuances. I mean, I enjoy
the autonomy to handle these things in the, uh, in a professional
expeditious manner, as I see fit given the nature of them. But I
also see, particularly as like a noncompliance gets tied in with this,
the fact that we don’t have, if you will, very transparent, codified,
step by step procedures that we follow every single time can bite
us.
The flexibility is the upside and it’s the downside . . . . It means
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that I am making decisions . . . . And that’s my job . . . . But I have
to decide, you know, pretty quickly what the correct response is
and who to contact and where to go with it . . . . So having that,
um, in the hands of a, a single individual . . . almost always it’s,
it’s a single individual who’s handling it and that, I think, might
be, that could be a problem.
Informants also noted that the embedded discretion for IRBs to select among
processes can also make it difficult to train successors in the process more
generally, which could lead to inconsistency over time.
One doesn’t really know if there’s a right or wrong way of dealing
with this. You just do whatever makes sense for the
participant . . . . [There’s] a lot of flexibility. And a lot of
discretion. Uh, it’s up to the discretion of, um, me for the most
part. That’s -- that’s the problem . . . . [It’s] not impossible [to
train someone else]. The challenge is that, um, it’s a subjective
process that depends on my view of what’s going on initially . . . .
it would be difficult to document, if necessary the triage process,
because that is based on, largely on subjectivity and intuition and
a lot of intangible characteristics.
Informants therefore viewed the deliberate exercise of procedural flexibility
as a means of serving participation and legitimacy values, as well as the more
proximate goal of system efficiency. But flexibility was not an unabated good, and
it complicated values such as procedural predictability and equality, as well as the
proximate goals of consistency and system transparency. The following section
will consider informants’ appraisals of process goals and values more generally.
IV. APPRAISING IRB-MANAGED IDR SYSTEMS
Apart from asking informants to describe their procedures, the interviews also
asked informants to appraise the strengths and weaknesses of their complaint
resolution systems. Informants identified a number of strengths, including the
contributions of procedural flexibility. But informants also noted problems from
their perspectives, including concerns about low uptake, the capacity of the IRB to
act as a third-party neutral, frustration with available resources, and the potential
for inconsistency across participants or time.
This Article now moves from a descriptive to normative view to provide a
critical appraisal of IRBs’ IDR systems. Strengths include the ability of these
processes to consider both rights and interests, as well as the voluntary nature of
participation and the continued access to litigation where participants choose to
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file claims. But among system weaknesses, I echo some of the informants’
concerns, focusing more specifically on participant non-consultation, low uptake,
and IRBs’ institutional capacities to behave neutrally and skillfully in the dispute
resolution role. This Part will first describe informants’ appraisals, followed by my
own.
A. Informants’ Appraisals
Beyond the strengths afforded by procedural flexibility, informants described
many other advantages of their complaint resolution processes. The institutions
that compensated subjects who sustained research-related injuries—either by
institutional insurance or by de facto provision of medical treatment—viewed the
availability of a financial remedy as a particular strength. (In contrast, institutions
with “fuzzy” language on injuries or policies of nonpayment were a source of great
frustration to informants, who would prefer to have the option to make subjects
whole for physical injuries.) Many informants noted that their process functions
well to give both subjects and investigators the opportunity to be heard and
respected, and those with a written or standardized process were more likely to
describe consistency and transparency as system strengths. The personal qualities
of individuals involved in the process—such as substantive knowledge of the
regulations, experience handling complaints and investigators, personal
experience in the investigator role, interpersonal or counseling skills, and
(sometimes) dispute resolution training—were also viewed as strengths.
Informants appraised decision quality in terms of accuracy about facts, finality and
non-recurrence of the dispute, parties’ satisfaction, and the ability to enact systemlevel change for disputes that indicate a systemic problem. Most institutions
believed their processes functioned well on these measures, and believed that they
had struck the best possible balance between protecting participants, treating
investigators fairly, and safeguarding the interests of the institution.
1. Access and Uptake
Despite the perceived strengths of their processes, informants believed the
frequency of complaints was surprising low, and many were puzzled by the
shortage. As one informant said, “I’ve always felt that the number of complaints
we get is remarkably small for the size of our research operation . . . . The
information [about our IRB] is really prominent in our consent forms, but . . . it
just seems odd to me, um, that we don’t have more.” Informants who sought to
explain this shortage of complaints offered different explanations for the scarcity.
Some noted that research staff are likely the first port of call for a subject
complaint, and these informants emphasized the need for IRBs to train
investigators and staff to respond thoroughly to subject concerns. Several
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institutions that primarily conducted social and behavioral research suggested that
complaints are infrequent because their research portfolio tended to be minimal
risk, or excluded clinical trials. One research hospital informant noted that
complaints are likely low because all hospital patients know they are receiving
research-related services, giving them a different set of expectations about their
care. Others suggested that participants enrolled in therapeutic research are less
likely to complain, compared to healthy individuals who participate in research for
financial reasons and may have more complaints related to compensation.
But as interviews continued, many informants suggested that research
participants may be unable or unwilling to call the IRBs with complaints.
Participants may not understand research protocols, making it difficult for them to
form expectations – and thus, difficult to identify when they have experienced a
wrong. Even if participants are aware that the IRB provides a venue for dispute
resolution, they may be fearful of the consequences of complaining. Subjects
enrolled in ongoing protocols or clinical care may also fear retaliation or stigma
after lodging a complaint.
It’s probably the tip of the iceberg underneath that one [complaint]
in two years is people that were frustrated and wanted to complain
but they talked themselves out of it . . . I think there’s some stigma
attached to, um, calling up somebody that works for the
university . . . I think the person would be uncomfortable to call
the university.
We have a low number, and I’d like to think that’s because
everyone’s so excellent at what they do . . . . [But] I fear that
sometimes there’s people that might want to share something or
talk through something, and they don’t share because . . . [they]
are also patients . . . and the research study might even be headed
by the person who also provides their clinical care . . . . We
definitely try to set up a system of being anonymous and we keep
them separated from the investigator and all that good stuff, but
even with all those protections I feel people might hesitate to say,
or they might not even be sure what to complain about. You know
what I mean, they’re not always 100% positive of how a consent
process should really be executed. Did they have enough time to
think through it and ask their questions? They might not even feel
confident, if they’ve had a bad experience, that they had a bad
experience. I’m always very surprised that we have the small
number that we do.
Sometimes the researcher is also their physician that they have
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known for years and maybe the complaint is about some aspect of
the study, but they don’t want to sour the relationship that they’ve
had with a certain specialist or something like that.
Finally, informants also noted that subjects may be uncertain about the process
for dispute resolution, and this uncertainty may make the process inaccessible.
Although the consent forms consistently directed participants to the IRBs,
informants expressed concern that this information was not prominent or clear
enough to empower subjects to use the system.
I’m sort of surprised that more people don’t call us or ask
questions . . . I just think people don’t necessarily think to call us,
you know? . . . . I’ve often thought maybe we should, it would be
interesting to do a study about putting the IRB’s phone number
first on the consent form to see if we got more calls. Because I
think with that many protocols . . . I think we’d have more calls.
I think that people probably don’t report it enough, and I don’t
know if that has to do with, maybe perception of research
compliance, or if our participants really are just not aware that
they can report . . . . I definitely think that there has been . . . some
instances where a student or participant could complaint, but they
just don’t . . . because they just brush it off, or because they, you
know, are really not aware of the procedure, or if they just don’t
understand the importance of reporting.
Some may argue that low uptake of a complaint resolution is appropriate for
research-related complaints; in a setting where many complaints may entail nonjusticiable or minor harms, lumping the complaint or exiting the relationship123
may be more efficient for many subjects and institutions. Institutions certainly
benefit from the comparatively low administrative costs of a seldom-used
complaint procedure. But the low frequency of complaints may be problematic in
this context for several instrumental reasons, even without considering inherent
value of dispute resolution for subjects. First, silence on minor complaints obscure
systemic problems that eventually expose institutions to significant legal risks,
such as deficiencies in informed consent procedures. Second, dissatisfied subjects
who feel they must lump their disputes can contribute to difficult relationships
between institutions and their surrounding communities, which can spill over into
other conflicts. Third, when subjects choose to exit scientific research or decline
123 Jost, supra note 29, at 314; William L.F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on
Dispute Processing, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 63, 81 (1974).
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to reenroll in future protocols, the institution must divert more resources to study
recruitment and retention, thus increasing the costs of research and reducing the
feasibility of human subjects protocols. The disproportionately low frequency of
complaints, therefore, may not be fully in institutions’ best interests at present.
Fully explaining the low uptake of institutions’ dispute resolution processes
requires more research with participants themselves, in order to explore
perceptions of research experiences that give rise to complaints, their awareness of
the availability and content of a complaint resolution process, and their
expectations and perceptions of these institutionally controlled ADR systems. But
my research with the designers and implementers of IRBs’ processes suggests that
research subjects do not receive sufficient information to make the complaint
resolution process accessible—perhaps because they do not understand or believe
that they have grounds to complain, because they are unaware of the forum, or
because they are unaware of the procedural safeguards the forum provides. And
moreover, even if participants are aware of mistreatment and the venue for
complaint resolution, they may nonetheless be deterred by fears that complaining
will result in stigma, retaliation, deterioration of relationships with care providers,
or loss of access to services. The low uptake of these processes suggests that many
subjects do not currently view them as meaningful options for complaint
resolution.
2. Neutrality
Despite agreeing that IRBs had authority to resolve disputes, some informants
expressed discomfort with placing the IRB in the role of a neutral third party. The
most visible stakeholders in complaints are the subject and the investigator, but
complaints also implicate the institution, the broader communities of which
subjects are a part, and the legitimacy and progress of science as a greater social
good. The federal regulations task IRBs with protecting subject welfare, and some
informants suggested that this biased their judgments to favor subjects. As one
noted, “Because of the way the staff then would view their roles here . . . they’re
more participant, uh, oriented. And I always just have to point out to them . . . you
need to give the investigator an equal chance.” Another concurred: “I do think we
need to remain neutral though in before until we get all of the facts . . . . But our
end and ultimate goal is to protect the rights um of the participant to make sure
they are treated correctly.” Some informants even suggested that placing
participants first was the best way to serve institutional interests: “I have to follow
the regulations to protect the institution, as well as to protect the participant . . . in
that way they’re kind of woven together . . . . follow the regulations, be accurate,
and honor the subject’s complaint.”
But some informants also noted that ties to investigators and institutions can
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complicate these loyalties. As one reflected, “You’re here as an IRB staff. You
need to work for the subject. You you’re protecting the subject, not the PI . . . . But
the PI is a colleague . . . . So you need to have balance between both discussions.”
As institutional dispute resolution scholars would note, IRBs are institutional arms,
staffed by institutional employees, and IRB professionals are aware of their role in
protecting their institution throughout the complaint resolution process. As one
informant noted, “I think [neutrality] is important, but I think it’s very difficult to
achieve . . . for us to be impartial . . . . I do think we’re biased toward the institution
because of our employment status.” Or as another noted, “The first, you know, line
of protection needs to be the participants but . . . as university officials there’s a, a
responsibility to the university as well.” The burden of neutrality and pressure from
the institution can make these dispute resolution processes highly stressful for IRB
personnel, as one informant described:
When our office has to engage in a very kind of intense uh
investigation and follow up for a complaint . . . it’s pretty stressful
on our resources and on our personnel. There have definitely been
times when we have uh feared for our safety because an
investigator feels their um their career is on the line, and when the
institution feels that you know their reputation is on the line. And
[when] we’re trying to pursue um you know an investigation that
may have some implications for the institution . . . we might feel
our job is in jeopardy . . . . It’s personally very stressful . . . .
We’ve been . . . trying to understand the reasons for burnout and
turnover . . . in our office. And any compliance office I think, um,
has similar issues because it’s just the nature of this kind of work,
compliance work . . . our turnover is pretty high . . . . Our biggest
weakness is dealing with institutional oversight, and kind of being
able to make our determinations in an autonomous way.
These concerns did not arise in all institutions; some informants reported little
difficulty viewing their role as a third-party neutral. As one informant said, “I’m
not representing or defending the role of the investigator or any institution, that
I’m neutral because our goal . . . our goal is human subject protection and that
[resolving disputes is] part, it’s part of it so [I’m] definitely neutral.” But it is
important to note that neutrality may not be perfectly secured through an internal
process, and IRBs are aware of these tensions.
3. Resources and Training
In part due to the rarity of participant complaints, many informants noted that
they had not received extensive training or professional development to handle
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disputes directly. A small minority of informants had completed complaint
resolution or mediation training, but they had done so for other purposes, such as
institution-wide HR initiatives or training for previous employment. Although
many informants noted that they felt comfortable handling most subject complaints
due to their institutional mandate to protect participants, they also reported
uncertainty about how to manage complaints that may involve mental illness,
threats of violence, and volatile interpersonal dynamics. When asked what
resources could improve their processes, informants were most likely to mention
the need for dispute resolution skills building, mediation training, or counseling
training throughout the IRB office.
Informants sometimes noted struggling with the manpower and time needed
to handle complex complaints, particularly given other IRB functions such as
initial and ongoing protocol review. Multiple institutions also reported difficulties
documenting complaints in a helpful way, and as noted, most did not document
complaints in a manner that would allow for systematic analysis over time. Again,
many described this as the result of rare complaints, since there may not be enough
for a helpful analysis of systemic problems. As one informant noted, “I would be
interested in a little more formal feedback loop . . . if we had data that would show
if . . . there’s a lot of complaints in a certain area then we could increase, redirect
our education program . . . . It would be, you know, allocation of resources to
prevent [problems].”
Informants also reported having little or no information about other
institutions’ processes, making it difficult to appraise and improve their systems.
This arises in part from the nonpublic nature of these ADR systems, but also from
a general lack of professional attention because complaints are currently rare.
Many suggested that PRIM&R, the organization for IRB professionals, could build
capacity by focusing on this issue in annual conferences or continuing education,
such as providing case studies or an aggregation of best practices across
institutions.
4. Consistency and Monitoring
As the previous section noted, some informants expressed concerns about
consistency and predictability. In large part, this reflected the procedural flexibility
that they viewed as essential to achieving participation and legitimacy goals. But
many also suggested that the rareness of complaints may undermine consistency,
since the procedures are not invoked often enough to become routine: “I know that
we can all improve our processes. It’s one of those areas that we don’t see a lot of
them . . . since it’s infrequent and it’s, each case is individual, it’s hard to come up
with, you know, systematic processes.”
Some also noted that it was difficult to gauge whether their processes were in
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fact consistent or successful, because they did not have enough complaints to
assess how the system functioned as a whole. “[The process] hasn’t really been
tested . . . . with all our policies, even in writing, they were in draft form for quite
a while. You really don’t know, have you covered everything, until . . . the scenario
arises and you pull the policy and you’re ready to walk those steps out . . . You
never know the holes until you find them.” Institutions with larger research
portfolios with a larger absolute number of complaints are less likely to have this
problem, but informants from such institutions still noted difficulties with
documenting complaints in a way that allows them to monitor for consistency and
systemic problems.
B. A Critical Appraisal of IDR Processes
Taken as a whole, this study has revealed a set of institutional dispute
resolution systems with broad procedural flexibility, institutional discretion, and
management by institutional employees who perceive an ethical and regulatory
imperative to protect subjects—but who also note conflicting loyalties to
investigators and the institution as a whole. The system design typically matches
the priority that informants placed on values of participation, revelation, and
privacy; subjects and investigators have a full opportunity to communicate facts,
these parties have some opportunities to shape the process and remedy, the system
accommodates both justiciable and non-justiciable claims, decisions are reasoned
and almost always written, decisions are enforceable within the scope of IRBs’
regulatory authority, and the systems aim for party satisfaction as a primary
proximate goal. To the extent that participation directly shapes party acceptance of
the system, the processes serve legitimacy values as well, both for parties and the
broader project of scientific advancement.
In relation to a recent framework of preferred design elements for ADR
systems,124 these systems also have several key strengths: they offer multiple
process options (e.g., facilitated negotiation, quasi-arbitration), and accommodate
both interests and legal rights. They provide flexibility for complaining subjects to
have input on the process, although the processes made little distinction between
rights and interests. Participation is voluntary and confidential for subjects
(although less voluntary for investigators, who are subject to IRB authority), and
the system aimed for transparency of process while parties were engaged in the
dispute. Parties may also pursue litigation even after the conclusion of these IDR
processes, in most cases.
Despite these advantages, this case study also reveals several key deficiencies
of the systems. This Section will consider three problems in particular: (1) lack of
participant input on system design; (2) potential underutilization; and (3)
124 Smith & Martinez, supra note 27, at 128.
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challenges to IRB neutrality and resources for dispute resolution. This Part will
conclude with a set of recommendations to improve on existing practices.
1. Exclusion of Participants from System Design
The origins of IRBs’ IDR systems are largely stories of “muddling
through.”125 Across all institutions, IDR processes arose informally as a set of
departmental practices when IRBs responded to unexpected complaints, and those
practices were responsive to institutional resources and IRBs’ perceived role. At
some institutions, practices for complaint resolution remain informal, and even
unwritten. Other institutions have codified their practices, but most did not do so
until prompted by the AAHRPP accreditation process. Where IRBs consulted
external resources during process development, they were likely to ask other IRBs
for guidance, rather than developing a new process with input from institutional
and external stakeholders. IRBs typically described small modifications over time
in response to institutional constraints and learning, but few to none had
undertaken a wholesale examination of their complaint resolution practices. As
noted above, AAHRPP requires a written policy for the resolution of complaints,
but does not set requirements for how these systems are designed and operated.
In light of these origins, all the IDR systems in this Article were uniformly
designed without the input of participant representatives. Literature on dispute
system design emphasizes the importance of involving all stakeholders—all those
who are “affected either by the problem/conflict or by a potential solution.”126 This
can allow dispute system designers to account for parties’ interests in process
design, and to build in elements of procedural justice from the earliest
opportunity.127 The informal nature of procedure development clarifies why this
has not happened, but it is plausible, ethical, and practical for IRBs to remedy the
issue when there is an opportunity to reconsider their current policies.
Two factors may mitigate the exclusion of participants from the development
of these IDR processes, but these are incomplete remedies for non-consultation.
First, some might classify the IRB itself as a participant representative—it is, after
all, bound to ensure the protection of research subjects. But IRBs are composed of
members who are dissimilar, in most ways, from research participants. Per the
Common Rule, IRBs must include at least five members “with varying
backgrounds,” with efforts made to avoid discrimination by race and gender, and
must include at least one scientist, one nonscientist, someone from outside the
125 See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79
(1959).
126 NANCY H. RODGERS, ROBERT C. BORDONE, FRANK E.A. SANDER & CRAIG A. MCEWEN,
DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING DISPUTES 72 (2013).
127 Id. at 75.
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institution, and someone knowledgeable about applicable laws and standards of
professional practice.128 IRBs reviewing research with vulnerable populations
(e.g., children, pregnant women, prisoners, people with mental disabilities) must
also include individuals who are “knowledgeable” and “experienced” in working
with these groups.129 Experience in working with subjects, however, does not mean
that IRBs understand how participants may experience research complaints, nor
how they would prefer to seek redress at the institution. Moreover, many IDR
procedures have developed within IRB administrative offices, rather than being
considered by the full IRB.
Secondly, IRBs give participants some say over procedural options, such as
electing anonymity, choosing between mediation or an arbitration-like process, or
bringing disputes to a trusted local authority for protocols that have provided that
choice. Giving participants choices at the time of the dispute alleviates the problem
of non-consultation at the outset. But participant feedback is nonetheless important
at the time of system design. Having a say in process development is important in
part as a matter of procedural justice, but also as a matter of improving system
accessibility, the durability of resolutions, and perceived legitimacy of the process
(and the research institution more generally).
Consulting participant groups is daunting and complex. Institutions have
enormous research portfolios, and it is impossible to consult a representative from
every participant constituency. Research changes over time, and current
participants may not be well-placed to represent future participants’ needs. The
difficulty of incorporating participant perspectives may be one reason why these
views are so frequently omitted from general discussions of research ethics.130 Part
V will consider potential pragmatic strategies for soliciting participants’ views of
the dispute resolution system, as well as outcomes that IRBs should consider in
evaluating whether system changes have led to improvement.131
2. Process Underutilization
It is difficult to know what an “optimal” number of participant complaints
may be. We do not know the frequency of actual or experienced misconduct in
research, nor do we know the frequency of physical injury. Moreover, we do not
know the number of complaints that participants would deem sufficiently serious
to seek resolution, rather than lumping or dismissing the problem. Of this number,
we also do not know how many complaints are already addressed by investigators
and their staffs, without escalating to the level of an IRB report. If the number of
128 45 C.F.R. § 46.107 (2018).
129 Id.
130 DRESSER, supra note 11.
131 See Section V.A.
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complaints made to IRBs rose sharply, it may be practically impossible for existing
institutions to resolve each complaint with the full complement of processes
described here—intake, consultation, fact-finding, deliberation, decision, and
appeal. Substituting an abbreviated process for the sake of inefficiency could
disadvantage complainants with more complex grievances; at the other end of the
spectrum, scaling up dispute resolution resources to handle large numbers of
complaints may divert resources that are currently used for other ends, such as
medical treatment or research expenses. Without knowing the number of
complaints that participants may have in aggregate—including those never
brought to the IRB’s attention—it is difficult if not impossible to measure
important system outcomes such as participant access and uptake.
It is possible to argue that the number of complaints currently received by IRB
dispute resolution systems is in fact optimal. But almost all the informants in this
study believed that their processes were underutilized. Prior research on participant
comprehension of research protocols at the time of informed consent suggests that
there are frequent disparities between participants’ expectations and the reality of
clinical trials.132 For example, research on the “therapeutic misconception” and
“preventive misconception” shows that as much as 62% of participants may be
expected to believe that medications are effective or have “unrealistic beliefs”
about the likelihood of benefit, when those drugs are in fact unproven.133 This is
one example of experiences that may not match expectations; many other surprises
and misadventures are possible. The numbers in Table 2 may also give us pause to
reconsider utilization; a median complaint frequency of 2.2 per 1,000 protocols
(which enroll far more than 1,000 subjects!) seems far lower than what might be
expected.
Considering these facts, it is reasonable to believe that utilization of these IDR
programs is low. Although low uptake may be immediately advantageous for
institutions with limited human resources on their IRBs, leaving research-related
disputes unresolved can expose research institutions to adverse consequences such
as future litigation, future media exposure, poor reputation, and increased costs of
future research.
Some of the causes of low system uptake may be difficult to remedy in health
care systems that merge therapeutic research with clinical care. Subjects may not
wish to jeopardize their care relationships by complaining about studies conducted
132 See Flory & Emanuel, supra note 7, at 1593 (citing studies, including one showing that 30%
of participants in cancer trials believed that they were receiving a treatment already proven to be the
best for their cancer).
133 Paul Appelbaum et al., Therapeutic Misconception in Clinical Research: Frequency and
Risk Factors, 26 IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. 1 (2004); Charles W. Lidz et al., Therapeutic
Misconception and the Appreciation of Risks in Clinical Trials, 58 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1689 (2004);
Alan E. Simon et al., Preventive Misconception: Its Nature, Presence, and Ethical Implications for
Research, 32 AM. J. PREV. MED. 370 (2007).
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by their own clinicians. Subjects in all institutions and all types of protocols may
also be skeptical of the neutrality of any forum offered by the institution, including
the IRB itself, and past research abuses have created a legacy of institutional
mistrust in many communities. The dispute resolution systems in this case study
were designed exclusively by the institutions, and although subjects could select
their desired level of involvement in the process, the institutions did not consult
subjects or subject groups during the initial design stage. These barriers may persist
regardless of dispute system design, even with an external third-party neutral and
advance notice of procedural protections such as the ability to remain anonymous.
But low uptake also reflects a lack of information, particularly lack of
awareness of the forum and the process for dispute resolution, and systems can
seek to remedy these problems by better educating subjects during study
enrollment and follow-up. Subjects’ awareness and understanding of protocols and
“subjects’ rights”—and thus, their expectations of how they should be treated—
will inform whether they recognize wrongs as actionable. More effective education
about protocol design and clear enunciation of other interests—such as a right to
be treated with dignity during the study, or a right to voice concerns about study
processes—may help. The low uptake almost certainly reflects low subject
awareness of IRB oversight, authority over studies, and availability to resolve
subject complaints.
Where subjects do understand that a forum exists for the resolution of their
complaints, they currently have no way of knowing what will happen when they
contact that forum. IRBs do not provide advance notice of procedural protections
such as anonymity or confidentiality, nor are subjects aware of how the IRB will
proceed to address their concerns. Because procedures are so flexible, written
processes may be imprecise or absent, and they are not made available to potential
subjects in detail. Subjects do not know in advance, for example, that facilitated
negotiation is available, that the IRB makes decisions independent of the research
team, or that complaints can sometimes lead to changes in institutional policies
that may benefit future subjects. A lack of information about the process, which in
part derives from broad procedural flexibility, may undermine predictability and
subjects’ perception of control over their complaints.
3. IRB Neutrality and Capacity
As noted throughout this Article, IRBs have several interests that come into
conflict when they manage research-related disputes. IRBs are required to
prioritize subject welfare (which may disadvantage researchers); they are
colleagues of researchers who are repeat players in IRB review (which may
disadvantage participants); and they are also members of the institution and aware
of institutional interests. Furthermore, IRBs who oversee disputes are also the very
114

Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

59

Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 18 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 2

RIGHTING RESEARCH WRONGS

institutional representatives who initially approved study protocols to proceed. If
disputes escalate to litigation, IRBs themselves may be liable for negligent
protocol approval and oversight,134 giving them a direct stake in resolving disputes
quickly and with minimal institutional exposure. A participant complaint about
study procedures may also be viewed as a challenge to IRBs’ original
determination that the procedures were ethical, which asks IRBs to revisit these
initial judgments at the moment of the complaint. This could compromise equality
and accountability, despite IRBs’ regulatory role and sincere commitment to the
interests of the subject. A long history of scholarship vacillates between two poles:
some characterize IRBs as intrusive and stifling to researchers,135 while others have
viewed IRBs as insufficiently protective, overworked, and vulnerable to capture
by researchers.136 From the view of IRB personnel themselves, this study suggests
sincere efforts at neutrality, but informants acknowledged that multiple interests—
and the salience of institutional interests in particular—made this challenging.
The lack of neutrality of a third-party decision-maker can be inimical to all
process values in dispute resolution,137 including participation, accountability, and
legitimacy. Participants skeptical of neutrality may decline to use IDR processes,
or they may disengage if their experience with the process does not fulfill their
expectations of fairness. Neutrality problems can also impair accountability if the
decision-maker favors one disputing party, either due to conscious or unconscious
bias. A lack of neutrality can also impair legitimacy, if disputing parties do not
accept the process or the outcome as fair; this can challenge the durability of
resolutions and lead to more disengagement from the process over time.
Importantly, however, although these are potential problems, we do not have
evidence yet that they are occurring. The study in this Article conducted interviews
with IRBs themselves, rather than disputing parties. The broader literature on
complaints in human subjects research is also thin, and although there are many
records of researcher discontent with IRB decisions (particularly on protocol
approval and disapprovals), there is little evidence specific to the participant
complaint context.
There are also compelling advantages to using IRBs to manage researchrelated disputes. IRBs have enforceable authority to suspend research protocols, to
require revisions or remedies internal to research protocols, or to cancel protocols
134 Mello et al., supra note 19.
135 Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review Boards, 2004 SUP. CT. REV.
271 (2004); Philip Hamburger, Getting Permission, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 405 (2007).
136 Hazel Glenn Beh, The Role of Institutional Review Boards in Protecting Human Subjects:
Are We Really Ready To Fix a Broken System?, 26 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (2002); Donna Shalala,
Protecting Research Subjects – What Must Be Done, 343 N. ENG. J. MED. 808 (2000); Ezekiel J.
Emanuel et al., Oversight of Human Participants Research: Identifying Problems to Evaluate Reform
Proposals, 141 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 282 (2004).
137 Redish & Marshall, supra note 37.
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entirely, IRBs already have the scientific expertise to understand protocols and
potential deviations, and they are familiar with each of the protocols from which
disputes arise. IRBs’ regulatory role may partially mitigate the lack of neutrality
from the participant perspective (although not from the researcher perspective).
IRBs within the institution can quickly mobilize other institutional actors, such as
department chairs, legal counsel, human resources, and compliance departments
that may assist in fact-finding. Moreover, there institutional role as the guardian of
participant welfare means that IRBs should be involved, somehow, in any IDR
process for research-related disputes. In light of the low frequency of complaints,
institutions may also find it inefficient to invest in a separate IDR process for
research-related disputes.
The balance of advantages and disadvantages shifted somewhat in multi-site
studies under the 2018 revisions to the Common Rule, which requires that multisite studies use a single IRB of record.138 For these studies, the IRB that approved
the study may be at a different institution from where the complaint arises.
Presumably, these studies could refer complaints either to the local IRB at their
site, or to the IRB of record. Local IRB may be somewhat less familiar with study
procedures, but they may also have less concern for their own interest (in the event
that the dispute escalates to litigation involving the approving IRB). Referring all
complaints to the IRB of record presents other advantages, such as familiarity with
the protocol and potentially less concern about liability of their own research
institution. The revised Common Rule does not specify how complaints or injuries
arising from such study should be resolved, leaving this an open question.139
Without evidence of current harm, and given the structural advantages of
using IRBs for resolving research-related complaints, it is sensible to leave these
dispute resolution processes within the IRB. But this raises questions of
institutional support and IRB training for dispute resolution tasks. Informants in
this study described burdens in implementing the IDR process, including
substantial human resources, time necessary for deliberation on both process and
outcome, emotional strain and fatigue, and a lack of skills training in relevant areas
such as mediation or conflict resolution. IRBs are already (and have long been)
overtaxed in time and resources, and they navigate an increasingly complex set of
federal, state, and institutional policies. Particularly if the number of complaints
were to increase, IRBs currently lack some expertise and resources needed for an
effective response to complex or emotionally fraught complaints.
This discussion raises the question of IRBs’ capacity and motivation to make
changes to their IDR systems. To that end, IRBs have some advantages that make
138 82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (Jan. 19, 2017); 45 C.F.R. § 46.114(b)(1) (2018).
139 Stark & Greene, Clinical Trials, supra note 72 (noting that centralized IRB review raises
questions about allocating institutional liability).
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them well-positioned to improve these processes. Human research protection
programs are fairly small and self-contained within their institutions, and they have
a great deal of discretion over their internal procedures and their interpretations of
federal regulations. IRBs or the heads of human research protection programs often
report directly to institutional presidents or vice presidents for research, and IRBs’
independent federal mandate to protect research participants gives them a separate
source of authority to make changes that they deem necessary for that goal. IRB
chairs and administrative staff are extremely well educated, as noted in this study,
and they are attentive to their federal mandate, as this study has suggested. The
informants in this study often expressed the motivation to improve their processes,
including asking about other institutions’ best practices, and many noted that this
was the first time they had the opportunity to reflect on this institutional function.
In their institutional capacity, moreover, these informants had power to make or
credibly suggest changes to existing policies. It appears, therefore, that there would
be high capacity and perhaps high motivation to change these systems given
awareness of the need. But to date, IRBs have experienced a low frequency of
complaints, creating few opportunities to reconsider their processes or to evaluate
their effectiveness. IRBs also may lack the time, financial resources, and
manpower to study this issue or to make resource-intensive changes. Some of the
suggestions below, such as compensating injured participants, may be beyond the
power of the IRB, and more properly suggested to institutional presidents or
general counsels. But where changes are inexpensive and fairly straightforward,
there is good reason for optimism about IRBs’ capacity and motivation to improve
their IDR processes.
V. IMPROVING IDR FOR RESEARCH-RELATED INJURIES
The previous Part describes a number of drawbacks of current IDR processes
for resolving research-related disputes. This Part will conclude with
recommendations for improving the functioning and fairness of these dispute
resolution systems.
As noted above, I stop short of recommending that these IDR systems be
relocated outside the IRB. To be sure, the Department of Health and Human
Services and the FDA could require the use of a neutral third-party mediator or
arbitrator through the federal regulations governing human subjects research. This
could also be achieved by federal or state statute, by professional accreditation
standards set by AAHRPP, or by changes in institution-level policies. But the costs
of this choice may well outweigh the gains for most disputes, particularly those
that do not allege physical injury or a legal claim against the institution (and even
for these claims, the use of a neutral third party may still pose the problem of the
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institution as a repeat player).140 The structural advantages of having IRBs
involved in dispute resolution for research-related injuries are great, and although
non-neutrality is problematic, it is inherent to all IDR systems, and it is partially
offset (from the subject perspective) by the IRB mandate to protect subjects.
Imposing the requirement of a third-party neutral from outside the institution
would also scale up the costs of disputes and could impose inefficient levels of
process for minor complaints. Requiring subjects to bear these costs would impair
access to the forum, as most subjects would be unable or unwilling to pay.
Institutions could bear the costs, but this may impair neutrality of the forum for
third-party decision-makers that were repeatedly retained. Requiring research
sponsors to bear the costs would increase the expense of research more generally,
posing tradeoffs between paying for more research or more administrative costs.
I will also stop short of recommending changes to the Common Rule to
structure or constrain IDR as implemented by IRBs. This is for a similar reason;
although we now have evidence from IRBs about how their processes currently
work, including some likely deficiencies, we do not have systemic evidence that
these deficiencies are experienced by subjects or researchers as harmful. IRBs
described uses of procedural flexibility in order to promote participant priorities,
such as voice and access. Mandating and monitoring IRB compliance with new
regulatory requirements for complaint resolution, especially when the frequency
of complaints may be low, is likely to increase inefficiencies in the current system.
It may also discourage innovation, such as institutions that began using local
trusted authorities in culturally or linguistically distinct participant populations to
assist in handling disputes. Changing federal regulations may also not be necessary
to improve IDR practices in IRBs; there are numerous examples of internal
changes in IRBs that did not require a regulatory nudge.141 Interviews with these
informants suggested that many institutions were open to guidance and an
opportunity to revisit their IDR procedures, and the informal nature of many of
these IDR systems may facilitate the incorporation of new ideas without a
regulatory requirement.
A. Consult Research Participants During System Design
First, IRBs should make efforts to consult participants at the moment of
system design, or during periodic reevaluation of procedures. As noted above, this
is not entirely straightforward, given that institutions often have many thousands
of research portfolios representing a large number of different participant groups.
As a practical matter, consultation of participants’ perspectives on dispute
system design could either occur on a protocol-by-protocol basis or at the level of
140 Galanter, supra note 12.
141 Stark, Victims, supra note 72 (citing examples).
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the IRB. On a per-protocol basis, IRBs could ask researchers to consult with
representatives from participants or the larger community—such as through the
use of a community advisory board142—to ascertain participant preferences for
dispute resolution in the individual study. Or similarly, IRBs could ask researchers
to disclose more information about the dispute resolution process, and to ask for
informal feedback at the time of informed consent or the conclusion of studies.143
Researchers could then report this information in aggregate back to the IRB for
consideration. Another strategy may be for institutions to randomly select a small
number of ongoing protocols and invite subjects enrolled in these protocols to give
feedback on the dispute resolution procedure at the time of informed consent.
At the level of the IRB, the easiest (and least representative) method for
soliciting feedback on the IDR system would be to ask participants for feedback
while they are using the process, or perhaps after their issue is resolved. This may
yield a biased perspective, however, because it will only capture the views of
participants who have already chosen to use the system in its current form. IRBs
could collect more representative feedback by soliciting comments from all
participants in approved protocols at a given point in time—such as by allowing
anonymous comments through a web portal, using a process akin to notice-andcomment rulemaking, or a series of public meetings.144 Researchers could
publicize this comment process to their current research participants. Or IRBs
could prospectively identify the most common participant populations in their
approved studies, and conduct focus groups sampling from these groups. This
would be the most resource-intensive option, however, and it would likely be
beyond the capacity of most IRBs.
The opportunity for subject participation in the design of these IDR processes
may assist in improving access, procedural options, participation, and perceived
legitimacy of the process. Where comments suggest potential improvements, IRBs
could make provisional changes to their policies and assess the impact of these
changes. These impacts should include outcomes such as complaint type and
frequency, participant satisfaction, perceived legitimacy of the process,
142 A community advisory board (CAB) is a small group of community stakeholders in a
research project that provides meaningful input on the design and implementation of a research
protocol. See, e.g., Stephen F. Morin et al., Community Consultation in HIV Prevention Research: A
Study of Community Advisory Boards at 6 Research Sites, 33 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY
SYNDROMES 513 (2003); Sandra Crouse Quinn, Protecting Human Subjects: The Role of Community
Advisory Boards, 6 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 918 (2004).
143 Another strategy would be to require a representative for particular participant groups to be
on the IRB, as is currently done for research with prisoners, 45 C.F.R. § 46.304(b) (2018)—but this
may be more burdensome in practice.
144 Gathering these data would not count as “research” for IRB purposes, because it is not
intended to contribute to “generalizable knowledge”—it would be solely for the purposes of
improving internal operations. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(l) (2018).
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participants’ perception of the institution’s accountability during research, and
participant awareness of the dispute resolution forum.
B. Increase Disclosure and Involve Participant Community Leaders
Second, IRBs should consider a range of other options to increase uptake and
process utilization by participants. Although as a practical matter, no IRB wants to
add to its workload, the informants in this study were convinced that low complaint
frequencies indicated a problem with awareness and access. The remedy for lack
of awareness is, of course, disclosure. IRBs can publicize their IDR processes on
their websites, but it would be more useful to disclose more information at the time
of informed consent. Several issues complicate disclosure. First, when processes
are highly informal or malleable, there may be no formulate procedure to publicize;
IRBs may therefore choose to highlight several process options, such as the option
to make an anonymous complaint or the option of having an IRB staff member
mediate communication with the investigator. Next, most investigators know little
about the complaint resolution process, which means that institutions must educate
not only subjects, but also investigators about this IRB function. Furthermore,
adding elements to informed consent is not costless. Informed consent forms can
be long and complex, and recent changes to the Common Rule reflect some of
these problems.145 Adding information about dispute resolution systems can
compete for subject attention and extend the duration and complexity of the
informed consent process. It may also attune participants to the possibility that they
could be harmed, which could hinder enrollment or increase mistrust. But this is
unlikely to be a substantial barrier; according to a recent study, even when
participants are aware of the death of a healthy subject at the same institution, only
17% said this changed their thoughts about joining research, and only 4% said it
would change their future participation.146
None of these drawbacks should hinder greater disclosure of institutions’
processes for resolving research-related complaints. Meaningful consent to
research must be predicated on “essential information that a reasonable person
would want to know in order to make an informed decision about whether to
participate”147—and the availability and quality of a forum to resolve researchrelated disputes and injuries may be essential for many participants. IRBs could
potentially improve the effectiveness of these disclosures by asking investigators
to convey this information verbally. Several reviews of informed consent strategies
have shown that verbal disclosure and discussion is the most effective means of
145 80 Fed. Reg. 53970 (Sept. 8, 2015).
146 Caitlin E. Kennedy et al., When a Serious Adverse Event in Research Occurs, How Do
Other Volunteers React?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL RES. HUM. RES. ETHICS 47 (2011).
147 82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (Jan. 19, 2017).
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communicating with research participants,148 and this would be an appropriate and
efficient means of disclosing subjects’ options in the event that complaints arise.
Another strategy for increasing process uptake may be to use a practice that
several institutions have pioneered: asking investigators to identify a trusted
member of the community to receive complaints and represent participant interests
in communicating them to the IRB. Several institutions reported using trusted local
authorities to help process complaints in research with distinctive populations,
such as Native American tribes. One advantage of this process is that it outsources
part of the responsibility to investigators to build stronger relationships with local
subject communities; investigators must identify someone who can be familiar
with the protocol and accept complaints, and then convey those complaints to the
investigator or to the IRB. Investigators can then disclose this information to
subjects as part of the informed consent process. Of course, subjects should keep
the ability to complain to the IRB directly, in case the trusted local authority is
unfamiliar or an inappropriate resource for them personally. But this may have
additional benefits of improving investigators’ engagement with participant
populations, while also increasing the accessibility of the process to subjects.
Another variation on this theme may be to add a member of the participant
population as a temporary consultant to the IRB during deliberations about subject
complaints arising from that protocol.
C. Compensate Participants for Physical Injuries
The informants in the study who expressed the greatest comfort with their IDR
processes were at institutions that had agreed—either explicitly or as a de facto
matter—to compensate participants for physical injuries sustained during human
subjects research. There have been repeated calls and detailed proposals for U.S.
research institutions to compensate participants for injuries, but this is not yet
federally required.149 Indeed, the NIH does not compensate participants for
injuries, and there is no requirement that U.S. research institutions carry insurance
for this purpose.150 Many institutions had an unwritten practice of compensating
injured participants, often by providing treatment themselves (e.g., at their own
hospital) and waiving participant costs or cost-sharing. But nearly half of the
institutions had a policy of never compensating subjects for physical injury (17%),
or only compensating subjects when the research funders would agree to it up front
(30%).
Compensation policies clearly facilitate dispute resolution of research-related
complaints. IRB personnel who knew that their institution would ultimately pay
148 Flory & Emanuel, supra note 7; Nishimura et al., supra note 7.
149 Pike, supra note 5; Elliott, supra note 19.
150 Id.
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participants for injuries sustained reported far greater confidence in managing
disputes, less defensiveness, less concern about institutional liability and
escalation of the dispute, and a greater sense that the system was operating
ethically under Belmont Report principles for protecting human subjects. Although
compensation was rarely if ever offered for non-physical injury, allowing
compensation in cases of tangible harm was viewed as an essential procedural
option. Informants at institutions that disallowed payments for injuries noted their
frustration with this practice, and some commented that they wish their institution
would institute more flexible policies.
This Article therefore echoes prior calls for institutions to compensate
participants for tangible injuries sustained over the course of research, either by
self-funding or purchasing insurance for this purpose. In addition to the ethical
rationale for paying for research harms, allowing these payments has a highly
pragmatic function of facilitating all dispute resolution in this context.
D. Build IRB Capacity for Conflict Resolution
The previous Part outlined some of the deficiencies of IRBs in expertise and
resources for conflict resolution. The remedy is straightforward. In order to
improve IDR processes—or to continue current processes in the event that process
uptake increases—research institutions may need to devote additional personnel
and training to IRB offices, or add administrative staff members who have prior
training in conflict resolution. Very few of the personnel responsible for resolving
complaints had training in dispute resolution; approximately 6% were trained as
J.D.s, but even informants with law degrees noted that they lacked training on the
interpersonal elements of conflict resolution or ADR. Research institutions could
help meet these expertise needs by running workshops for IRB personnel—
particularly managers and administrators, rather than members—or by considering
conflict resolution training during hiring. Another method of increasing this
expertise is to add modules to the Certified IRB Professional (C.I.P.) course run
by the Council for Certification of IRB Professionals. More than 50% of
informants in the study had obtained this qualification, suggesting that training
modules on conflict management would be a good means of disseminating this
information. Although AAHRPP accreditation was frequently described as
complex and somewhat burdensome, an AAHRPP recommendation of having
conflict resolution training would be another means of encouraging expertisebuilding among IRBs.
Human resources may be another need—again, particularly if the frequency
of complaints increases. Complex complaints, although rare, were highly resourceintensive for IRB personnel. Many have called on research institutions to invest
more in IRBs, and in human resource protection programs more generally, to
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improve the speed and quality of protocol review. Improving IRB responses to
participant complaints may be another reason to expand this area of the institution,
if the frequency or complexity of complaints increases.
E. Use Records Effectively
IRBs can also improve their IDR systems through their practices for recordkeeping and systematic examination of those records over time. Many IRBs did
not record complaints in a manner that would allow for comparison across
protocols, or over time. Making these comparisons at regular intervals, such as
one- or two-year periods, could help IRBs identify recurring issues; they could
address these through investigator training and protocol review instead of
piecemeal responses to complaints. Creating a way to view complaints together
would also improve institutional memory and consistency, particularly at times of
personnel turnover, which may be essential for highly informal processes. IRBs
are sensitive to local precedent,151 and they may welcome opportunities to ensure
that their responses to subject issues are consistent over time.
F. Provide for (Advisory) Third-Party Review
Instead of requiring the use of a third-party neutral for the initial resolution of
every complaint, it may be more feasible and efficient to provide for appeals to an
external reviewer or internal ombudsman to review IRBs’ final decisions about
complaints. At present, IRBs usually give investigators a written decision once a
complaint is resolved. Investigators have an opportunity to appeal for
reconsideration, but IRBs typically do not give or publicize to participants the
possibility of an appeal. In some ways this lopsided procedure makes intuitive
sense; IRBs can sanction investigators, but not participants, as part of the
resolution, so investigators may make more use of this appeal mechanism. But
from the participant’s perspective, someone dissatisfied with the IRB’s decision
may feel that they have experienced harm without remedy, and some may want the
same appeal option to demonstrate that they are being treated equally in the
process.
An IRB could, therefore, address both concerns about neutrality and lopsided
appeals by providing for an independent reviewer, which could be requested by
the investigator, the participant, or even perhaps by the IRB itself if they seek a
second opinion or fear institutional interference. This could function similarly to
the external review mandated by state and federal law for coverage disputes in
private health insurance, but would likely be far smaller in scope.152 Given IRBs’
151 STARK, supra note 72
152 Hunter, supra note 32.
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current goal of subject satisfaction with the process—and their view that most
participants are in fact satisfied—the uptake (and therefore costs) of this external
review are likely to be fairly low. Institutions could collaborate with one another
to develop the infrastructure for this independent reviewer—for example, research
institutions in each state could contribute to the costs of maintaining an ad hoc
independent external reviewer for the state or region. When a subject or researcher
invokes independent review, the IRB would then send the reviewer any reports of
the complaint investigation and decision for their independent analysis and written
opinion.
Although this independent review process may resemble the process of
external review for health insurance coverage decisions, the process will
necessarily be weaker. In external review for health insurance coverage disputes,
the decision of the external review process is binding on the insurance company.
But for structural reasons, binding external review is complex and likely not viable
here. The federal regulations delegate authority for research protocol approval,
disapproval, and oversight to IRBs; the rules specifically provide that research
“may be subject to further appropriate review and approval or disapproval by
officials of the institution. However, those officials may not approve the research
if it has not been approved by an IRB.”153 The Common Rule does not permit
institutions to delegate this authority outside the IRB (although using an external,
paid IRB that is subject to federal regulation is permitted). Moreover, if the
reviewer were an ombudsman within the institution, he or she could require more
stringent protocol restrictions or termination, but could not lift protocol restrictions
or reverse a study termination required by the IRB. This would make binding
review of little use to investigators facing sanctions. Some complaints may also
raise issues outside the IRB’s purview, such as complaints of investigator
harassment, which are typically referred to human resources and handled as legal
matters.
For this reason, binding review by an independent party, or even binding
review by an internal ombudsman who is not part of the IRB, is likely unavailable
here; review will be advisory rather than binding. But even an advisory review of
IRB decisions would be useful in alleviating concerns about neutrality and the
inequality of the current appeals process. IRBs will have the opportunity to
reconsider their findings in light of the third-party reviewer’s recommendation,
and then to adjust any protocol sanctions or remedies provided. The availability of
a third-party advisory review may also shape IRBs’ actions even when it is not
invoked. IRBs that know a third party will evaluate their decision may take greater
care in their analysis and written decisions, and they may produce (and
subsequently use) better records of their process. All of these changes may help
153 45 C.F.R. § 46.112 (2018).
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produce fairer and more effective decision-making throughout the dispute
resolution process.
VI. CONCLUSION
The empirical study in this Article was the first in-depth look at the highly
flexible systems that research institutions have established to mediate and, at times,
adjudicate disputes involving human subjects. Disputes in this area are
characterized in part by high stakes for investigators and institutional exposure to
liability, but also by disparities in socioeconomic power and sophistication
between participants and research institutions. Attention to fair process is therefore
an ethical and practical imperative for functioning systems. At present,
institutions’ IDR systems take advantage of IRBs’ mandate and authority to protect
subjects, and IRBs have instituted highly flexible procedures to maximize the
voice and satisfaction of research subjects who bring grievances. But
notwithstanding these strengths, IDR systems for research-related complaints also
pose problems of inclusion, access, neutrality, resources, and expertise. Changes
to the Common Rule, such as the requirement that multisite studies designate one
IRB of record, may continue to bring changes to how research-related disputes are
resolved.
In light of these findings, this Article has recommended a number of structural
changes to how IRBs handle research-related grievances. These include
suggestions for considering participant input on system design; increasing
publicity and accessibility through informed consent procedures and integration of
participant community leaders; compensating participants for physical injuries;
building IRB expertise and resources for conflict resolution; using records to
identify recurring complaints and improve consistency; and providing for advisory
third-party review and reconsideration of decisions, even if that review is not
binding. Institutions dedicated to protecting the welfare of human subjects may
well make these changes without being prompted by a change in federal or state
regulations; with the exception of the suggestion that institutions compensate
injured participants (which has repeatedly been ignored), these ideas build on
existing systems and do not require large resource outlays. The practical rewards
of a functioning IDR system may be great, including reduced institutional
exposure, improved community relations, and increased legitimacy of research at
the institution. But most importantly, these adjustments to IDR processes for
research-related harms are ethically warranted. The Belmont Report and other
ethical guidelines have spoken widely on the need to minimizing subject harm, but
have said little about how institutions can (and should) offer redress when they fail
to do. Participants in human subjects research take on many burdens in the interests
of scientific progress; when they experience unintended harms, they should not
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bear the additional burden of unfair process. This Article is a start toward that goal.
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